Federal system of reconnaissance and airspace control. Vii

11.10.2021

This problem can be solved by affordable, cost-effective and sanitary means. Such means are being built on the principles of semi-active radar (PAL) using the accompanying illumination of the transmitters communication and broadcasting networks. Today, practically all well-known developers of radar equipment are working on the problem.

The task of creating and maintaining a continuous 24-hour duty field for airspace control at extremely low altitudes (PMA) is difficult and costly. The reasons for this lie in the need to compact the orders of radar stations (radar), create an extensive communication network, saturation of the surface space with sources of radio emissions and passive re-reflections, the complexity of the ornithological and meteorological situation, dense population, high intensity of use and inconsistency of regulatory legal acts related to this area.

In addition, the boundaries of responsibility of various ministries and departments in exercising control over the surface space are fragmented. All this significantly complicates the possibility of organizing radar airspace monitoring at WWI.

Why you need a continuous surface airspace monitoring field

For what purposes is it necessary to create a continuous field for monitoring surface airspace in WWI in peacetime? Who will be the main consumer of the information you receive?

The experience of working in this direction with various departments indicates that no one is against the creation of such a field, but each interested department needs (for various reasons) its own functional unit, limited in goals, tasks and spatial characteristics.

The Ministry of Defense needs to control the airspace in WWI around defended objects or in certain directions. Border Guard Service - above the state border, and not higher than 10 meters from the ground. Unified air traffic management system - over aerodromes. Ministry of Internal Affairs - only aircraft preparing for take-off or landing outside the permitted flight areas. FSB - the space around secure facilities.

MES - areas of man-made or natural disasters. FSO - areas of stay of protected persons.

This situation testifies to the lack of a unified approach to solving the problems and threats that await us in the near-ground low-altitude environment.

In 2010, the problem of controlling the use of airspace in WWI was transferred from the field of responsibility of the state to the field of responsibility of the aircraft operators themselves.

In accordance with the current Federal rules for the use of airspace, a notification procedure for the use of airspace was established for flights in class G (small aircraft) airspace. From now on, flights in this class of airspace can be performed without obtaining an ATC clearance.

If we consider this problem through the prism of the theme of the appearance of unmanned aerial vehicles in the air, and in the near future, and passenger "flying motorcycles", then a whole range of tasks arises related to ensuring the safety of the use of airspace at extremely low altitudes over populated areas, industrial-hazardous areas ...

Who will control movement in low-altitude airspace?

Companies in many countries around the world are developing such affordable low-altitude vehicles. For example, the Russian company Aviaton plans to create its own passenger quadrocopter for flights (attention!) Outside airfields by 2020. That is, where it is not prohibited.

The reaction to this problem has already manifested itself in the form of the adoption by the State Duma of the law "On Amendments to the Air Code of the Russian Federation regarding the use of unmanned aerial vehicles." In accordance with this law, all unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) weighing more than 250 g are subject to registration.

In order to register a UAV, you must submit an application to the Federal Air Transport Agency in any form indicating the data of the drone and its owner. However, judging by how things are going with the registration of manned light and ultralight aircraft, it seems that the problems with unmanned aircraft will be the same. Now two different organizations are responsible for the registration of light (ultralight) manned and unmanned aircraft, and no one is able to organize control over the rules for their use in class G airspace over the entire territory of the country. This situation contributes to an uncontrolled increase in cases of violations of the rules for the use of low-altitude airspace and, as a consequence, an increase in the threat of man-made disasters and terrorist attacks.

On the other hand, the creation and maintenance of a wide monitoring field at PMV in peacetime by traditional means of low-altitude radar is hindered by restrictions on sanitary requirements for the electromagnetic load on the population and the compatibility of RES. The existing legislation strictly regulates the radiation regimes of RES, especially in populated areas. This is rigorously taken into account when designing new RES.

So what's the bottom line? The need for monitoring surface airspace at WWI objectively persists and will only grow.

However, the possibility of its implementation is limited by the high cost of creating and maintaining the field on the WWI, the contradictory legal framework, the absence of a single responsible body interested in a large-scale round-the-clock field, as well as restrictions imposed by supervisory organizations.

It is urgent to start developing preventive measures of an organizational, legal and technical nature aimed at creating a system of continuous monitoring of the airspace of the WWI.

The maximum height of the class G airspace border varies up to 300 meters in the Rostov region and up to 4.5 thousand meters in the regions of Eastern Siberia. In recent years, in the civil aviation of Russia, there has been an intensive growth in the number of registered facilities and operators of general aviation (GA). As of 2015, over 7 thousand aircraft were registered in the State Register of Civil Aircraft of the Russian Federation. It should be noted that in Russia as a whole, no more than 20-30% of the total number of aircraft (AC) of legal entities, public associations and private aircraft owners using aircraft are registered. The remaining 70-80% fly without an operator's certificate or without registration of aircraft at all.

According to estimates of NP GLONASS, in Russia annually sales of small unmanned aerial systems (UAS) are increasing by 5-10%, and by 2025 they will be purchased in Russia 2.5 million. It is expected that the Russian market in terms of consumer and commercial small Civilian UAS can account for about 3-5% of the global total.

Monitoring: economical, affordable, environmentally friendly

If we approach with an open mind the means of creating continuous monitoring of PMA in peacetime, then this problem can be solved with affordable, cost-effective and sanitary means. Such means are being built on the principles of semi-active radar (PAL) with the use of accompanying illumination of transmitters of communication and broadcasting networks.

Today, practically all well-known developers of radar equipment are working on the problem. SNS Research has published a report Military & Civil Aviation Passive Radar Market: 2013-2023 and expects to see more investment in both sectors by 2023 in developing such radar technologies. USD 10 billion, with annual growth in the period 2013-2023. will amount to almost 36%.

The simplest version of a semi-active multi-position radar is a two-position (bistatic) radar, in which the illumination transmitter and the radar receiver are separated by a distance exceeding the range measurement error. The bistatic radar consists of an accompanying illumination transmitter and a radar receiver, separated by a base distance.

As an accompanying illumination, the radiation of the transmitters of communication and broadcasting stations, both ground-based and space-based, can be used. The illumination transmitter generates an omnidirectional low-altitude electromagnetic field, in which the targets

With a certain effective scattering surface (ESR), they reflect electromagnetic energy, including in the direction of the radar receiver. The receiver's antenna system receives a direct signal from the illumination source and a delayed echo from the target.

In the presence of a directional reception antenna, the angular coordinates of the target and the total range relative to the radar receiver are measured.

The basis for the existence of PALs is the vast coverage areas of broadcast and communication signals. So, the zones of various mobile operators almost completely overlap, mutually complementing each other. In addition to the zones of illumination of cellular communications, the territory of the country is covered by overlapping radiation fields of broadcasting transmitters of TV, VHF FM and FM satellite TV broadcasting stations, and so on.

To create a multi-position radar monitoring network at PMV, a deployed communication network is required. Dedicated secure APNs - packet data transmission channels based on M2M telematics technology - have such capabilities. Typical characteristics of the throughput of such channels at a peak load are not worse than 20 Kb / s, but according to the experience of use, they are almost always much higher.

JSC "NPP" KANT "is researching the possibility of detecting targets in the field of illumination of cellular networks. In the course of research, it was found that the most widespread coverage of the territory of the Russian Federation is carried out by a communication signal of the GSM 900 standard. This communication standard provides not only sufficient energy of the illumination field, but also the technology of packet data transmission GPRS wireless communication with a speed of up to 170 Kb / s between elements of a multi-position radar separated by regional distances.

The work carried out within the framework of R&D has shown that typical suburban territorial frequency planning of a cellular network provides the ability to build a low-altitude multi-position active-passive system for detecting and tracking ground and air (up to 500 meters) targets with an effective reflecting surface of less than 1 sq. m.

The large height of the base stations on the antenna towers (from 70 to 100 meters) and the network configuration of cellular communication systems allow solving the problem of detecting low-altitude targets made using the stealthy technology of STELS, using spaced-out location methods.

Within the framework of R&D for the detection of air, ground and surface targets in the field of cellular networks, a passive receiving module (PPM) detector of a semi-active radar station has been developed and tested.

As a result of field tests of the PPM model within the boundaries of a cellular communication network of the GSM 900 standard with a distance between base stations of 4-5 km and a radiation power of 30-40 W, the possibility of detecting a Yak-52 aircraft at the estimated range of flights, UAVs - a DJI Phantom 2 quadrocopter was achieved , moving automobile and river transport, as well as people.

During the tests, the spatial and energy characteristics of detection and the capabilities of the GSM signal in terms of target resolution were evaluated. The possibility of transmitting packet detection information and remote mapping of information from the test area to a remote observation indicator is demonstrated.

Thus, to create a continuous round-the-clock multifrequency overlapping location field in the surface space on the PMV, it is necessary and possible to build a multi-position active-passive location system with the combination of information flows obtained using illumination sources of various wavelengths: from meter (analog TV, VHF FM and FM broadcast) to short decimeter (LTE, Wi-Fi). This requires the efforts of all organizations working in this direction. The necessary infrastructure and encouraging experimental data are available for this. We can safely say that the accumulated information base, technologies and the very principle of the hidden PAL will find their rightful place in wartime.

In the figure: "Diagram of a bistatic radar". For example, the current coverage area of the borders of the Southern Federal District by the signal of the mobile operator "Beeline" is given

To assess the scale of the placement of illumination transmitters, let's take, for example, the average Tver region. It has an area of 84 thousand square meters. km with a population of 1 million 471 thousand people, there are 43 broadcasting transmitters for broadcasting sound programs of VHF FM and FM stations with a radiation power of 0.1 to 4 kW; 92 analog transmitters of television stations with radiation power from 0.1 to 20 kW; 40 digital transmitters of television stations with a power from 0.25 to 5 kW; 1,500 transmitting radio-technical communication objects of various affiliations (mainly base stations of cellular communication) with radiation power from units of mW in an urban area to several hundred watts in a suburban area. The suspension height of the light transmitters varies from 50 to 270 meters.

I reported to the president that the Aerospace Forces, in accordance with the army and navy rearmament program adopted in 2012, have already received 74 new radar stations. This is a lot, and at first glance, the state of radar reconnaissance in the country's airspace looks good. However, serious unresolved problems remain in this area in Russia.

Effective radar reconnaissance and airspace control are indispensable conditions for ensuring the military security of any country and the safety of air traffic in the skies above it.

In Russia, the solution of this task is entrusted to the radar station of the Ministry of Defense and.

Until the early 1990s, the systems of military and civilian departments developed independently and practically self-sufficient, which required serious financial, material and other resources.

However, the conditions for airspace control were more and more complicated due to the increasing intensity of flights, especially foreign airlines and small aircraft, as well as due to the introduction of a notification procedure for the use of airspace and the low level of equipping civil aviation with respondents of the unified state radar identification system.

Control over flights in the "lower" airspace (zone G according to the international classification), including over megalopolises and especially in the Moscow zone, has become much more complicated. At the same time, the activity of terrorist organizations has intensified, capable of organizing terrorist attacks using aircraft.

The airspace control system is also influenced by the emergence of qualitatively new surveillance equipment: new dual-purpose radars, over-the-horizon radars and automatic dependent surveillance (ADS), when, in addition to secondary radar information from the observed aircraft, parameters are transmitted to the dispatcher directly from the aircraft navigation devices, and etc.

In order to streamline all the available means of observation, in 1994 it was decided to create a joint system of radar facilities of the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Transport within the framework of the federal system of reconnaissance and control of the airspace of the Russian Federation (FSR and KVP).

The first normative document that laid the foundation for the creation of the FSR and KVP was the corresponding decree of 1994.

According to the document, it was about a dual-use interagency system. The purpose of the creation of the FSR and the KVP was announced to combine the efforts of the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Transport to effectively solve the problems of air defense and traffic control in the airspace of Russia.

As work was carried out to create such a system from 1994 to 2006, three more presidential decrees and several government decrees were issued. This period of time was spent mainly on the creation of regulatory legal documents on the principles of the coordinated use of civil and military radars (Ministry of Defense and Federal Air Transport Agency).

From 2007 to 2015, work on the FSR and KVP was carried out under the State Arms Program and a separate federal target program (FTP) "Improving the federal system of reconnaissance and control of the airspace of the Russian Federation (2007-2015)". The main contractor for the implementation of the FTP was approved. According to experts, the amount of funds allocated for this was at the minimum allowable level, but the work has finally begun.

State support made it possible to overcome the negative trends of the 1990s and early 2000s to reduce the country's radar field and create several fragments of a unified automated radar system (ERS).

Until 2015, the area of airspace controlled by the Russian Armed Forces was growing steadily, while the required level of air traffic safety was maintained.

All the main measures provided for by the FTP were carried out within the established indicators, but it did not provide for the completion of work on the creation of a unified radar system (URS). Such a reconnaissance and airspace control system was deployed only in certain parts of Russia.

On the initiative of the Ministry of Defense and with the support of the Federal Air Transport Agency, proposals were developed to continue the actions of the program that had been started, but not completed, in order to fully deploy a unified system of reconnaissance control and airspace control over the entire territory of the country.

At the same time, the Concept of Aerospace Defense of the Russian Federation for the Period up to 2016 and Beyond, approved by the President of Russia on April 5, 2006, envisages a full-scale deployment of a unified federal system by the end of last year.

However, the action of the corresponding FTP ended already in 2015. Therefore, back in 2013, following the results of a meeting on the implementation of the State Armament Program for 2011-2020, the President of Russia instructed the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Transport, together with and to submit proposals for amending the Federal Target Program “Improvement of the federal system of reconnaissance and control of the airspace of the Russian Federation (2007- 2015) ”with the extension of this program until 2020.

The corresponding proposals were supposed to be ready by November 2013, but Vladimir Putin's order was never fulfilled, and work to improve the federal system of reconnaissance and airspace control has not been funded since 2015.

The previously adopted FTP ended its operation, but the new one was never approved.

Previously, the coordination of the relevant work between the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Transport was entrusted to the Interdepartmental Commission for the Use and Control of Airspace, established by a presidential decree, which was abolished back in 2012. After the liquidation of this body, there was simply no one to analyze and develop the necessary regulatory framework.

Moreover, in 2015 in the federal system of reconnaissance and airspace control, the position of general designer was removed. The coordination of the FSR and KVP bodies at the state level has actually ceased.

At the same time, competent specialists now recognize the need to improve this system by creating a promising integrated dual-purpose radar (IRRS DN) and combining the FSR and KVP with a reconnaissance and warning system for an aerospace attack.

The new dual-use system should have, first of all, the advantages of a single information space, and this is possible only on the basis of solving many technical and technological problems.

The need for such measures is evidenced by the complication of the military-political situation, and the intensification of threats from aerospace in modern warfare, which have already led to the creation of a new type of armed forces - Aerospace.

In the aerospace defense system, the requirements for the FSR and KVP will only grow.

Among them is the provision of effective continuous control in the airspace of the state border along its entire length, especially in the probable directions of the strike of aerospace attack weapons - in the Arctic and in the southern direction, including the Crimean peninsula.

This without fail requires new funding for the FSR and KVP under the appropriate federal target program or in another form, the re-creation of a coordinating body between the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Transport, as well as the approval of new program documents, for example, until 2030.

Moreover, if earlier the main efforts were aimed at solving the problems of airspace control in peacetime, then in the coming period the tasks of warning of an air attack and information support of combat operations to repel missile and air strikes will become priorities.

- military columnist for Gazeta.Ru, retired colonel.
Graduated from the Minsk Higher Engineering Anti-Aircraft Missile School (1976),
Military Command Academy of Air Defense (1986).
Commander of the S-75 anti-aircraft missile battalion (1980-1983).
Deputy commander of an anti-aircraft missile regiment (1986-1988).
Senior officer of the General Staff of the Air Defense Forces (1988-1992).
Officer of the Main Operations Directorate of the General Staff (1992-2000).
Military Academy graduate (1998).
Observer "" (2000-2003), editor-in-chief of the newspaper "Military-Industrial Courier" (2010-2015).

It is impossible without the creation of an effective system of reconnaissance and airspace control. An important place in it is occupied by a low-altitude location. The reduction of subdivisions and means of radar reconnaissance has led to the fact that over the territory of Russia today there are open sections of the state border and internal regions of the country.

OJSC NPP Kant, which is part of the state corporation Rostekhnologii, is conducting research and development work on the creation of a prototype of a multi-position spaced-apart semi-active radar system in the radiation field of cellular communication systems, radio broadcasting and terrestrial and space-based television ( complex "Rubezh").

In accordance with the federal law "On the sanitary and epidemiological welfare of the population" dated March 30, 1999, No. 52-FZ, radiation standards have been established, which are mandatory throughout Russia. The radiation power of any of the known air defense radars is many times higher than these standards. The problem is aggravated by the high probability of using low-flying, stealthy targets, which requires the consolidation of the combat formations of the radar of a traditional fleet and an increase in the cost of maintaining a continuous low-altitude radar field (MSSR).

To create a continuous 24-hour MVRLP on duty with a height of 25 meters (the height of the flight of a cruise missile or an ultralight aircraft) along a front of only 100 kilometers, at least two radars of the KASTA-2E2 (39N6) type are required, the power consumption of each of which is 23 kW. Taking into account the average cost of electricity in 2013 prices, only the cost of maintaining this section of the MVRLP will be at least 3 million rubles per year. Moreover, the length of the borders of the Russian Federation is 60,900,000 kilometers.

In addition, with the outbreak of hostilities in the conditions of active use of electronic suppression (EW) by the enemy, traditional standby locating means can be largely suppressed, since the transmitting part of the radar completely unmasks its location.

It is possible to save the expensive resource of the radar, increase their capabilities in peacetime and wartime, as well as increase the noise immunity of the MSSR by using semi-active location systems with a third-party illumination source.

For detecting air and space targets

Research on the use of external radiation sources in semi-active location systems is being widely conducted abroad. Passive radar systems analyzing signals from TV broadcasting (terrestrial and satellite), FM radio and cellular telephony, HF radio communications, which are reflected from targets, have become one of the most popular and promising fields of study over the past 20 years. It is believed that the American corporation Lockheed Martin has achieved the greatest success here with its Silent Sentry system.

Own versions of passive radars are being developed by Avtec Systems, Dynetics, Cassidian, Roke Manor Research, as well as the French space agency ONERA. Active work on this topic is being carried out in China, Australia, Italy, Great Britain.

Similar work on target detection in the field of illumination of television centers was carried out at the Military Engineering Radio Engineering Academy of Air Defense (VIRTA Air Defense) named after V.I. Govorov. However, the significant practical groundwork obtained more than a quarter of a century ago in the use of illumination of analog radiation sources for solving semi-active location problems turned out to be unclaimed.

With the development of digital broadcasting and communication technologies, the possibilities of using semi-active location systems with external illumination have appeared in Russia as well.

Developed by JSC "NPP" Kant " complex of multi-position spaced-apart semi-active radar system "Rubezh" designed to detect air and space targets in the field of external illumination. This illumination field is distinguished by the cost-effectiveness of airspace monitoring in peacetime and resistance to electronic countermeasures during war.

The passive mode of operation of the "Rubezh" complex makes it possible to ensure the secrecy of these means and to use the structure of the complex in wartime. Calculations show that the secrecy of a semi-active location system in terms of the concealment coefficient is at least 1.5–2 times higher than that of a radar with a traditional combined construction principle.

The use of more cost-effective means of locating the standby mode will significantly save the resource of expensive combat systems by saving the established limit of resource consumption. In addition to the standby mode, the proposed complex can also perform tasks in wartime conditions, when all sources of radiation of the peace period will be disabled or disabled.

In this regard, a far-sighted decision would be to create specialized non-directional transmitters of latent noise radiation (100-200 W), which could be thrown or installed in threatened directions (in sectors) in order to create a field of external illumination during a special period. This will make it possible, on the basis of the networks of receiving modules remaining from peacetime, to create a hidden multi-position active-passive wartime system.

There are no analogues to the "Rubezh" complex

The Rubezh complex is not an analogue of any of the well-known models presented in the State Armament Program. At the same time, the transmitting part of the complex already exists in the form of a dense network of base stations (BS) of cellular communications, terrestrial and satellite transmitting centers for radio broadcasting and television. Therefore, the central task for "Kant" was the creation of receiving modules for signals reflected from the targets of external illumination and a signal processing system (software and algorithmic support that implements systems for detecting, processing reflected signals and combating penetrating signals).

The current state of the electronic component base, data transmission and synchronization systems makes it possible to create receiving modules compact, with small weight and dimensions. Such modules can be located on cellular communication masts, using the power lines of this system and without exerting any influence on its operation due to their insignificant power consumption.

Sufficiently high probabilistic detection characteristics make it possible to use this tool as an unattended, automatic system for establishing the fact of crossing (flying) a certain boundary (for example, the state border) by a low-altitude target, followed by the issuance of preliminary target designation to specialized ground-based or space-based means about the direction and boundary of the intruder's appearance.

The main characteristics of the system were tested by a series of practical experiments on the detection of low-altitude targets, carried out by OAO NPP Kant with the assistance of OAO RTI im. Academician A.L. Mints "and the participation of the staff of the VA VKO them. G.K. Zhukov. The test results confirmed the prospects of using low-altitude semi-active target location systems in the field of illumination of BS of GSM cellular communication systems.

When the receiving module was removed at a distance of 1.3–2.6 kilometers from the BS with a radiation power of 40 W, the Yak-52 target was confidently detected under various observation angles both in the front and rear hemispheres in the first resolution element.

The configuration of the existing cellular communication network allows building a flexible pre-field for monitoring low-altitude air and surface space in the field of illumination of the BS of the GSM communication network in the border zone.

The system is proposed to be built in several detection lines at a depth of 50–100 km, along the front in a band of 200–300 km and in height up to 1500 meters.

Each detection boundary represents a sequential chain of detection zones located between BSs. The detection area is formed by a single-base diversity (bistatic) Doppler radar. This fundamental decision is based on the fact that with transmissive detection of a target, its effective reflecting surface increases many times over, which makes it possible to detect inconspicuous targets made using the "Stealth" technology.

Building up the capabilities of VKO

From the line to the line of detection, the number and direction of passing targets is being specified. In this case, algorithmic (calculated) determination of the range to the target and its height becomes possible. The number of simultaneously registered targets is determined by the bandwidth of information transmission channels over the lines of cellular communication networks.

Information from each detection zone is transmitted via GSM networks to the Information Collection and Processing Center (ICPC), which can be located many hundreds of kilometers from the detection system. The identification of targets is carried out by direction finding, frequency and time characteristics, as well as when installing video recorders - by the image of targets.

Thus, complex "Rubezh" will allow:

1.create a continuous low-altitude radar field with multiple multifrequency overlap of radiation zones created by various sources of illumination;

2. to provide air and ground control facilities for the state border and other territories of the country, which is poorly equipped with traditional radar facilities (the lower border of the controlled radar field is less than 300 meters, created only around the control centers of large airports. airlines that do not fall below 5000 meters);

3.significantly reduce the cost of placement and commissioning in comparison with any similar systems;

4.To solve problems in the interests of almost all law enforcement agencies of the Russian Federation:

- MO (building up a low-altitude radar field on duty in threatened directions);

- FSO (in terms of ensuring the security of state security facilities - the complex can be located in suburban and urban areas to monitor air terrorist threats or control the use of surface space);

- ATC (control over flights of light aircraft and unmanned vehicles at low altitudes, including air taxis - according to the forecasts of the Ministry of Transport, the annual increase in small aircraft for general aviation is 20% annually);

- FSB (tasks of anti-terrorist protection of strategically important facilities and protection of the state border);

- Ministry of Emergency Situations (monitoring of fire safety, search for crashed aircraft, etc.).

The proposed means and methods for solving the problems of low-altitude radar reconnaissance in no way cancel the means and complexes created and supported by the Russian Armed Forces, but only increase their capabilities.

/Andrey Demidyuk, Doctor of Military Sciences, Associate Professor;
Evgeniy Demidyuk, Candidate of Technical Sciences, vpk-news.ru/

Reliable Aerospace Defense (VKO) of the country is impossible without the creation of an effective system of reconnaissance and airspace control. An important place in it is occupied by a low-altitude location. The reduction of subunits and means of radar reconnaissance has led to the fact that over the territory of the Russian Federation today there are open sections of the state border and internal regions of the country. OJSC NPP Kant, which is part of the state corporation Rostekhnologii, is conducting research and development work on the creation of a prototype of a multi-position spaced-apart semi-active radar system in the radiation field of cellular communication systems, radio broadcasting and terrestrial and space-based television (Rubezh complex).

Today, the manifold increased accuracy of targeting weapons systems no longer requires the massive use of air attack weapons (SVN), and the stricter requirements of electromagnetic compatibility, as well as sanitary norms and rules do not allow in peacetime to "pollute" the populated areas of the country with the use of microwave radiation. high-potential radar stations (radar). In accordance with the federal law "On the sanitary and epidemiological welfare of the population" dated March 30, 1999, No. 52-FZ, radiation standards have been established, which are mandatory throughout Russia. The radiation power of any of the known air defense radars is many times higher than these standards. The problem is aggravated by the high probability of using low-flying, stealthy targets, which requires the consolidation of the combat formations of the radar of a traditional fleet and an increase in the cost of maintaining a continuous low-altitude radar field (MSSR). To create a continuous 24-hour MVRLP on duty with a height of 25 meters (the height of the flight of a cruise missile or an ultralight aircraft) along a front of only 100 kilometers, at least two radars of the KASTA-2E2 (39N6) type are required, the power consumption of each of which is 23 kW. Taking into account the average cost of electricity in 2013 prices, only the cost of maintaining this section of the MVRLP will be at least three million rubles per year. Moreover, the length of the borders of the Russian Federation is 60,900,000 kilometers.

For detecting air and space targets

Hidden "Frontier" of air control

Similar work on target detection in the field of illumination of television centers was carried out at the Govorov Military Engineering Radio Engineering Academy of Air Defense (VIRTA Air Defense). However, the significant practical groundwork obtained more than a quarter of a century ago in the use of illumination of analog radiation sources for solving semi-active location problems turned out to be unclaimed.

With the development of digital broadcasting and communication technologies, the possibilities of using semi-active location systems with external illumination have appeared in Russia as well.

Developed by JSC NPP Kant, the complex of the multi-position spaced-apart semi-active radar system "Rubezh" is designed to detect air and space targets in the field of external illumination. This illumination field is distinguished by the cost-effectiveness of airspace monitoring in peacetime and resistance to electronic countermeasures during war.

The presence of a large number of highly stable radiation sources (broadcasting, communication) both in space and on Earth, forming continuous electromagnetic illumination fields, makes it possible to use them as a signal source in a semi-active system for detecting various types of targets. In this case, there is no need to spend money on the emission of its own radio signals. To receive signals reflected from targets, multichannel receiving modules (PM), which are located on the ground, are used, which, together with radiation sources, create a complex of semi-active location. The passive mode of operation of the "Rubezh" complex makes it possible to ensure the secrecy of these means and to use the structure of the complex in wartime. Calculations show that the secrecy of a semi-active location system in terms of the concealment coefficient is at least 1.5–2 times higher than that of a radar with a traditional combined construction principle.

No analogues

The "Rubezh" complex is not an analogue of any of the known models presented in the State Armament Program. At the same time, the transmitting part of the complex already exists in the form of a dense network of base stations (BS) of cellular communications, terrestrial and satellite transmitting centers for radio broadcasting and television. Therefore, the central task for "Kant" was the creation of receiving modules for signals reflected from the targets of external illumination and a signal processing system (software and algorithmic support that implements systems for detecting, processing reflected signals and combating penetrating signals).

Sufficiently high probabilistic detection characteristics make it possible to use this tool as an unattended, automatic system for establishing the fact of crossing (flying) a certain boundary (for example, the state border) by a low-altitude target with the subsequent issuance of preliminary target designation to specialized ground-based or space-based means about the direction and boundary of the intruder's appearance.

Thus, calculations show that the illumination field of base stations with a spacing between the BS of 35 kilometers and a radiation power of 100 W or more is capable of detecting low-altitude aerodynamic targets with an RCS of 1 m2 in the "clearance zone" with a probability of correct detection of 0.7 and a probability of a false alarm of 10–4 ... The number of tracked targets is determined by the performance of the computing facilities. The main characteristics of the system were tested by a series of practical experiments on the detection of low-altitude targets, carried out by OAO NPP Kant with the assistance of OAO RTI im. Academician A. L. Mints "and the participation of the staff of the VA VKO them. G.K. Zhukova. The test results confirmed the prospects of using low-altitude semi-active target locating systems in the illumination field of BS of GSM cellular communication systems. When the receiving module was removed at a distance of 1.3–2.6 kilometers from the BS with a radiation power of 40 W, the Yak-52 target was confidently detected under various observation angles both in the front and rear hemispheres in the first resolution element.

The configuration of the existing cellular communication network allows building a flexible pre-field for monitoring low-altitude air and surface space in the field of illumination of the BS of the GSM communication network in the border zone.

The system is proposed to be built in several detection lines at a depth of 50–100 kilometers, along the front in a strip of 200–300 kilometers and in height up to 1500 meters. Each detection boundary represents a sequential chain of detection zones located between BSs. The detection area is formed by a single-base diversity (bistatic) Doppler radar. This fundamental decision is based on the fact that with transmissive target detection, its effective reflecting surface increases many times over, which makes it possible to detect inconspicuous targets made using the "Stealth" technology.

Building up the capabilities of VKO

Thus, the "Rubezh" complex will allow:

to create a continuous low-altitude radar field with multiple multifrequency overlap of radiation zones created by various illumination sources;
to provide air and ground control facilities for the state border and other territories of the country, poorly equipped with traditional radar facilities (the lower border of the controlled radar field is less than 300 meters created only around the control centers of large airports. Over the rest of the territory of the Russian Federation, the lower border is determined only by the needs of escorting civil aircraft along the main airlines that do not fall below 5000 meters);
significantly reduce the costs of placement and commissioning in comparison with any similar systems;
to solve problems in the interests of almost all power departments of the Russian Federation: Ministry of Defense (building up a low-altitude radar field on duty in threatened directions), FSO (in terms of ensuring the security of state security facilities - the complex can be located in suburban and urban areas to monitor air terrorist threats or control the use of surface space ), ATC (control over flights of light aircraft and unmanned vehicles at low altitudes, including air taxis - according to the forecasts of the Ministry of Transport, the annual increase in small aircraft of general purpose is 20 percent annually), FSB (tasks of anti-terrorist protection of strategically important objects and protection of state borders), the Ministry of Emergency Situations (monitoring of fire safety, search for crashed aircraft, etc.).

The proposed means and methods for solving the problems of low-altitude radar reconnaissance in no way cancel the means and complexes created and supplied by the RF Armed Forces, but only increase their capabilities.

Reference Information:

Research and Production Enterprise "Kant" for more than 28 years has been developing, producing and carrying out maintenance of modern means of special communication and data transmission, radio monitoring and electronic warfare, information security systems and information channels. The products of the enterprise are used to supply almost all power structures of the Russian Federation and are used in solving defense and special tasks.

JSC "NPP" Kant "has a modern laboratory and production facilities, a highly professional team of scientists and engineering and technical specialists, which allows it to perform a full range of scientific and production tasks: from R&D, serial production to repair and maintenance of equipment in operation.

Authors: Andrey Demidyuk, Executive Director of JSC "NPP" Kant ", Doctor of Military Sciences, Associate Professor Evgeny Demidyuk, Head of the Department of Innovative Development of JSC "NPP" Kant ", Candidate of Technical Sciences, Associate Professor

BC/ NW 2015 № 2 (27): 13 . 2

AIRSPACE CONTROL THROUGH SPACE

Klimov F.N., Kochev M. Yu., Garkin E.V., Lunkov A.P.

High-precision air attack weapons, such as cruise missiles and unmanned attack aircraft, have evolved into a long range of 1,500 to 5,000 kilometers as they matured. The invisibility of such targets during flight requires their detection and identification on the acceleration trajectory. It is possible to fix such a target at a great distance, either by over-the-horizon radars (ZG radars), or by using satellite-based radar or optical systems.

Unmanned attack aircraft and cruise missiles most often fly at speeds close to the speeds of passenger aircraft, therefore, an attack by such means can be disguised as normal air traffic. This poses for airspace control systems the task of identifying and identifying such means of attack from the moment of launch and at the maximum distance from the lines of effective destruction of them by means of aerospace forces. To solve this problem, it is necessary to apply all existing and developed systems for monitoring and monitoring the airspace, including over-the-horizon radars and satellite constellations.

The launch of a cruise missile or attack unmanned aircraft can be carried out from the torpedo launcher of a patrol boat, from the external suspension of the aircraft or from a launcher disguised as a standard sea container located on a civilian dry cargo ship, car trailer, railway platform. The satellites of the missile attack warning system are already recording and tracking the coordinates of the launches of unmanned aircraft or cruise missiles in the mountains and in the ocean by the engine torch at the acceleration site. Consequently, the satellites of the missile attack warning system need to track not only the territory of a potential enemy, but also the waters of the oceans and continents globally.

The deployment of radar systems on satellites for aerospace control today is associated with technological and financial difficulties. But in modern conditions, such a new technology as broadcast automatic dependent surveillance (ADS-B) can be used to control airspace through satellites. Information from commercial aircraft via the ADS-B system can be collected using satellites by placing on board receivers operating at ADS-B frequencies and repeaters of the received information to ground-based airspace control centers. Thus, it is possible to create a global field of electronic observation of the airspace of the planet. Satellite constellations can become sources of flight information about aircraft in fairly large areas.

Information about the airspace coming from the ADS-B receivers located on the satellites makes it possible to control aircraft over the oceans and in the folds of the terrain of the mountain ranges of the continents. This information will allow us to separate and identify air attack assets from commercial aircraft.

ADS-B identification information on commercial aircraft, received via satellites, will create an opportunity to reduce the risks of terrorist attacks and sabotage in our time. In addition, such information will make it possible to detect emergency aircraft and aircraft crash sites in the ocean away from the coast.

Let us evaluate the possibility of using various satellite systems for receiving aircraft flight information via the ADS-B system and relaying this information to ground-based airspace control systems. Modern aircraft transmit flight information via the ADS-B system using onboard transponders with a power of 20 W at a frequency of 1090 MHz.

The ADS-B system operates at frequencies that freely penetrate the Earth's ionosphere. The ADS-B system transmitters located on board the aircraft have limited power, therefore, the receivers located on board the satellites must have sufficient sensitivity.

Using the energy calculation of the satellite communication line Airplane-Sputnik, we can estimate the maximum range at which it is possible to receive information by the satellite from aircraft. The peculiarity of the used satellite line is the restrictions on the weight, overall dimensions and power consumption, both of the on-board transponder of the aircraft and the on-board transponder of the satellite.

To determine the maximum range at which it is possible to receive messages by the ADS-B satellite, we will use the well-known equation for the line of satellite communication systems on the ground-satellite section:

where

- effective signal power at the transmitter output;

- effective signal power at the receiver input;

- the gain of the transmitting antenna;

- slant range from the spacecraft to the receiving ES;

- wavelength on the "DOWN" line

waves on the "Down" line;

- the effective area of the transmitting antenna aperture;

- the transmission coefficient of the waveguide path between the transmitter and the antenna of the spacecraft;

- the efficiency of the waveguide path between the receiver and the antenna of the ES;

Transforming the formula, we find the slant range at which the satellite can receive flight information:

d = .

We substitute the parameters corresponding to the standard onboard transponder and the satellite receiver into the formula. Calculations show that the maximum transmission range on the airplane-satellite link is 2256 km. Such an oblique transmission range on the plane-satellite link is possible only when operating through low-orbit satellite constellations. At the same time, we use standard on-board aircraft equipment, without complicating the requirements for commercial aircraft.

The ground station for receiving information has significantly less restrictions on weight and dimensions than the onboard equipment of satellites and aircraft. Such a station can be equipped with more sensitive receivers and antennas with high gain. Therefore, the communication range on the satellite-ground link depends only on the conditions of the line of sight of the satellite.

Using the data of the orbits of satellite constellations, we can estimate the maximum slant communication range between the satellite and the ground receiving station by the formula:

where H is the altitude of the satellite orbit;

- the radius of the Earth's surface.

The results of calculating the maximum slant range for points at different geographical latitudes are presented in Table 1.

		Orbcom	Iridium	Messenger	Globalstar	Signal
Orbit altitude, km				1400	1414	1500
Radius of the Earth North Pole, km	6356,86	2994,51	3244,24	4445,13	4469,52	4617,42
Earth radius Arctic Circle, km	6365,53	2996,45	3246,33	4447,86	4472,26	4620,24
Earth radius 80 °, km	6360,56	2995,34	3245,13	4446,30	4470,69	4618,62
Earth radius 70 °, km	6364,15	2996,14	3245,99	4447,43	4471,82	4619,79
Earth radius 60 °, km	6367,53	2996,90	3246,81	4448,49	4472,89	4620,89
Earth radius 50 °, km	6370,57	2997,58	3247,54	4449,45	4473,85	4621,87
Earth radius 40 °, km	6383,87	3000,55	3250,73	4453,63	4478,06	4626,19
Earth radius 30 °, km	6375,34	2998,64	3248,68	4450,95	4475,36	4623,42
Earth radius 20 °, km	6376,91	2998,99	3249,06	4451,44	4475,86	4623,93
Earth radius 10 °, km	6377,87	2999,21	3249,29	4451,75	4476,16	4624,24
Radius of the Earth equator, km	6378,2	2999,28	3249,37	4451,85	4476,26	4624,35

The maximum transmission range on the airplane-satellite line is less than the maximum slant range on the satellite-ground line for the Orbkom, Iridium and Gonets satellite systems. The maximum data slant range is closest to the calculated maximum data transmission range for the Orbcom satellite system.

Calculations show that it is possible to create an airspace observation system using satellite relaying of ADS-B messages from aircraft to ground-based centers for summarizing flight information. Such a surveillance system will increase the range of the controlled space from the ground point to 4500 kilometers without using inter-satellite communications, which will ensure an increase in the airspace control zone. By using inter-satellite communication channels, we will be able to control the airspace globally.

Fig. 1 "Airspace control using satellites"

Fig. 2 "Control of airspace with inter-satellite communication"

The proposed method of airspace control allows:

To expand the coverage area of the airspace control system, including to the water area of the oceans and the territory of mountain ranges up to 4500 km from the receiving ground station;

When using an inter-satellite communication system, it is possible to control the Earth's airspace globally;

Receive flight information from aircraft regardless of foreign airspace observation systems;

Select airborne objects tracked by the radar sensor according to the degree of their danger at the distant detection lines.

Literature:

1. E.A. Fedosov "Half a century in aviation". M: Bustard, 2004.

2. “Satellite communications and broadcasting. Directory. Under the editorship of L.Ya.Kantor ". M: Radio and communication, 1988.

3. Andreev V.I. “Order of the Federal Air Transport Service of the Russian Federation dated October 14, 1999. No. 80 "On the Creation and Implementation of a Broadcast Automatic Dependent Surveillance System in Civil Aviation of Russia."

4. Traskovskiy A. "Moscow Aviation Mission: Basic Principle of Safe Management". "Aviapanorama". 2008. No. 4.