Federal system of reconnaissance and airspace control problems of improvement. Vii

of these Federal Regulations

144. Control over compliance with the requirements of these Federal Regulations is carried out by the Federal Air Transport Agency, air traffic services (flight control) bodies in the zones and areas established for them.

Control over the use of the airspace of the Russian Federation in terms of identifying aircraft that violate the procedure for using the airspace (hereinafter - violating aircraft) and aircraft that violate the rules for crossing the state border of the Russian Federation is carried out by the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation.

145. In the event that an air traffic services (flight control) body detects a violation of the procedure for using the airspace of the Russian Federation, information about this violation is immediately brought to the attention of the air defense body and the aircraft commander, if radio communication is established with him.

146. The air defense bodies provide radar control of the airspace and provide the relevant centers of the Unified System with data on the movement of aircraft and other material objects:

a) threatening to illegally cross or illegally crossing the state border of the Russian Federation;

b) are unidentified;

c) violating the procedure for using the airspace of the Russian Federation (until the violation ceases);

d) transmitting the "Distress" signal;

e) flying letters "A" and "K";

f) flying for search and rescue operations.

147. Violations of the procedure for using the airspace of the Russian Federation include:

a) the use of airspace without the permission of the relevant center of the Unified System under the authorization procedure for the use of airspace, except for the cases specified in clause 114 of these Federal rules;

b) non-observance of the conditions brought by the center of the Unified System in the permit for the use of airspace;

c) failure to comply with the commands of the air traffic services (flight control) bodies and the commands of the aircraft on duty of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation;

d) non-observance of the procedure for using the airspace of the border strip;

e) non-compliance with the established time and local regimes, as well as short-term restrictions;

e) flight of a group of aircraft in excess of the number specified in the aircraft flight plan;

g) use of the airspace of the restricted area, flight restriction area without permission;

h) landing of an aircraft at an unplanned (undeclared) aerodrome (site), except for cases of a forced landing, as well as cases agreed with the air traffic services (flight control) body;

i) non-observance by the aircraft crew of the rules of vertical and horizontal separation (except in cases of an emergency on board the aircraft requiring an immediate change in the profile and flight mode);

(see text in previous edition)

j) unauthorized air traffic services (flight control) aircraft deviation outside the boundaries of the air route, local air line and route, except for cases when such a deviation is due to flight safety considerations (bypassing dangerous meteorological weather phenomena, etc.);

k) an aircraft entering a controlled airspace without the permission of an air traffic services (flight control) body;

M) flight of an aircraft in class G airspace without notification to the air traffic services unit.

148. When an intruder aircraft is identified, the air defense authorities send the "Mode" signal, which means a demand to stop violating the procedure for using the airspace of the Russian Federation.

The air defense bodies bring the "Mode" signal to the corresponding centers of the Unified System and take action to stop the violation of the procedure for using the airspace of the Russian Federation.

(see text in previous edition)

The centers of the Unified System warn the commander of the offending aircraft (in the presence of radio communication with him) about the "Mode" signal sent by the air defense authorities and assist him in stopping the violation of the procedure for using the airspace of the Russian Federation.

(see text in previous edition)

149. The decision on the further use of the airspace of the Russian Federation, if the commander of the violating aircraft ceases to violate the procedure for its use, shall be made by:

a) the chief of the duty shift of the main center of the Unified System - when performing international flights along the routes of air traffic services;

b) chiefs of duty shifts of the regional and zonal centers of the Unified System - when performing domestic flights along the routes of air traffic services;

c) the operational duty officer of the anti-aircraft defense - in other cases.

(see text in previous edition)

150. The centers of the Unified System and the air defense bodies shall notify each other, as well as the airspace user, about the decision taken in accordance with clause 149 of these Federal Rules.

(see text in previous edition)

151. When illegally crossing the state border of the Russian Federation, the use of weapons and military equipment of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation against an intruder aircraft, as well as when unidentified aircraft and other material objects appear in the airspace, in exceptional cases, the air defense bodies give a "Carpet" signal , which means the requirement for the immediate landing or withdrawal from the appropriate area of ​​all aircraft in the air, with the exception of aircraft involved in the fight against intruder aircraft and performing search and rescue missions.

(see text in previous edition)

The air defense bodies bring the "Carpet" signal, as well as the boundaries of the area of ​​operation of the said signal, to the corresponding centers of the Unified System.

(see text in previous edition)

The centers of the Unified System immediately take measures to withdraw the aircraft (their landing) from the area of ​​the "Carpet" signal.

(see text in previous edition)

152. In the event that the crew of the offending aircraft does not fulfill the command of the air traffic services (flight control) unit to terminate the violation of the procedure for using the airspace, such information is immediately communicated to the air defense units. Air defense authorities apply measures to the violating aircraft in accordance with the legislation of the Russian Federation.

Aircraft crews are obliged to comply with the commands of duty aircraft of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, which are used to stop violations of the procedure for using the airspace of the Russian Federation.

In the event that an intruder aircraft is forced to land, its landing is carried out at an airfield (heliport, landing pad) suitable for the landing of this type of aircraft.

153. In the event of a threat to the safety of the flight, including that associated with an act of unlawful interference on board the aircraft, the crew gives a "Distress" signal. On aircraft equipped with a danger signaling system, in case of an attack on the crew, an additional signal "MTR" is given. Upon receipt of the "Distress" and (or) "MTR" signal from the aircraft crew, air traffic services (flight control) units are obliged to take the necessary measures to provide assistance to the crew in distress and immediately transfer to the Unified System centers, aviation search coordination centers and rescue, as well as to the air defense authorities data on his whereabouts and other necessary information.

154. After finding out the reasons for the violation of the procedure for using the airspace of the Russian Federation, permission for the further implementation of an international flight or a flight associated with the intersection of more than 2 zones of the Unified System is accepted by the head of the duty shift of the main center of the Unified system, and in other cases - by the heads of duty shifts of the zonal center of the Unified system systems.

MILITARY THOUGHT No. 4/2000 p. 30-33

Federal system of reconnaissance and airspace control: problems of improvement

Lieutenant General A.V. SHRAMCHENKO

Colonel V.P. SAUSHKIN, candidate of military sciences

An IMPORTANT component of ensuring the national security of the Russian Federation and the safety of air traffic over the territory of the country is radar reconnaissance and airspace control. The key role in solving this problem belongs to the radar facilities and systems of the Ministry of Defense and the Federal Air Transport Service (FSVT).

At the present stage, when the issues of rational use of material and financial resources allocated for defense, conservation of resources of weapons and military equipment are becoming especially acute, the main direction of development of radar facilities and systems should be considered not the creation of new ones, but the organization of a more effective integrated use of existing ones. This circumstance predetermined the need to concentrate the efforts of various departments on the integration of radar facilities and systems into the Unified Automated Radar System (EARLS) within the Federal Air Intelligence and Airspace Control System (FSR and STC) of the Russian Federation.

Developed in accordance with the Decree of the President of Russia, the federal target program for improving the FSR and KVP for 2000-2010 proclaims as its goal the achievement of the required efficiency and quality of solving the problems of air defense, guarding the state border of the Russian Federation in the airspace, radar support of aviation flights and air traffic management at the most important air routes based on the integrated use of radar facilities and systems of the services of the RF Armed Forces and FSVT in the context of a reduction in the total composition of forces, assets and resources.

The main task of the first stage of improving the FSR and KVP (2000-2005) is the creation of EARLS in the Central and North Caucasian air defense zones, in the Kaliningrad air defense region (Baltic Fleet), in certain areas of the North-West and Eastern air defense zones on the basis of complex equipment of groups troops and positions of the FSVT with unified means of automation of interspecific use.

To this end, it is envisaged, first of all, to develop concepts for the development of radar detection means for equipping EARLS and a unified system for displaying the underwater, surface and air situation in naval theaters. Particular attention will be paid to the systemic issues of building a real-time information exchange system for the FSR and KVP on the basis of existing and prospective means.

During this period, it is necessary to master the serial production of radar devices that have passed state tests, unified complexes of automation equipment (KSA) for interspecific use in stationary and mobile versions, to begin systematic equipping of groups of forces with them in accordance with the strategy for creating an EARLS. In addition, it is necessary to determine the composition, organizational structure and armament of the mobile reserve of the FSR and KBIT of constant readiness, as well as a list of radio engineering units of the coastal surveillance service of the Navy for inclusion in the FSR and KVP, to develop proposals and plans for their phased re-equipment. It is necessary to take measures to modernize electronic equipment, extend its service life and maintain the existing fleet in good condition, R&D aimed at creating priority promising samples of interspecific use, develop norms (standards and recommendations) for basic equipment options for units of the Ministry of Defense and positions of FS VT for dual use, in in accordance with which they were retrofitted.

The result of the work should be testing experimental sections of EARLS fragments, equipping them with unified information exchange complexes, and spreading the experience gained to other air defense zones and areas.

In the second stage(2006-2010) it is planned to complete the formation of the EARLS in the North-Western and Eastern Air Defense Zones; creation of EARLS fragments in certain areas of the Ural and Siberian air defense zones; creation of a mobile reserve of FSR and KVP of constant readiness, its equipping with mobile radar and KSA of interspecific use; completion of R&D work on the development of priority promising models of radio electronic equipment for interspecific use and the beginning of the systematic equipping of FSR and KVP with them; completion of building a system for the exchange of information for the SDF and KVP as a whole; R&D on the development of unified modular radars and CSA for interspecific use; creation of a scientific and technical reserve for the further development and improvement of the FSR and KVP.

It should be noted that the strict departmental subordination of the radar facilities of the RF Armed Forces and the FSWT, combined with a low level of automation of the control processes of forces and radar reconnaissance assets, makes it difficult to build the FSR and KVP according to a single concept and plan, and especially the adoption of optimal decisions on its use in the interests of all radar consumers. information. Thus, the indicators of the effectiveness of the use of FSR and KVP in solving functional tasks, the patterns and principles of control, the powers and boundaries of responsibility of command and control bodies for controlling forces and means of radar reconnaissance in peacetime, while on alert and in the process of combat use, have not been determined.

The difficulty of identifying the patterns and principles of control of the SDF and KVP is due to insufficient experience in its use. It is required to create an appropriate terminology with the choice of the most accurate definitions of the basic concepts related to radar. Nevertheless, certain views have been formed on the principles of managing complex organizational and technical systems, the organization and methods of work of management bodies, taking into account the prospects for the development and implementation of automated control systems. A wealth of experience has been accumulated in solving problems of control of radar facilities and systems in the types of the RF Armed Forces and FSVT.

In our opinion, the management of the FSR and the KVP should be a set of coordinated measures and actions of the management bodies of the FSR and the KVP to maintain the subordinate forces and assets in constant readiness for their use and command them in the performance of assigned tasks. It should be carried out taking into account the requirements of all interested parties based on the automation of the collection, processing and distribution of information at all levels.

Studies have shown that, firstly, only centralized planning and management forces and means FSR and KVP at a given level of efficiency, it will maximize the preservation of the technical resource of radio electronic equipment, reduce the number of maintenance personnel, create a unified system of operation, repair and material and technical support, and significantly reduce operating costs; Secondly, organizational structure and management methods should be such that the capabilities of technical means are used to the maximum extent to achieve management objectives; thirdly, only complex automation of control processes and use of optimization models allow to achieve a significant increase in the efficiency of application FSR and KVP compared to traditional planning and management heuristic methods.

The basic principles of management of FSR and KVP, in our opinion, there should be centralization and one-man management. Indeed, the dynamism and transience of changes in the air and radio-electronic situation, especially in the context of combat operations, significantly increased the role of the time factor and the need for sole decision-making and firmly enforcing it. And this can be achieved only with strict centralization of rights in the hands of one person. The centralization of control will allow in a short time and in the best way to coordinate the actions of diverse forces and means FSR and KVP, effectively apply them, quickly focus efforts on the main directions, on the solution of the main tasks. At the same time, centralized control should be combined with giving subordinates initiative in determining how to accomplish their assigned tasks.

The need for one-man management and centralization of management also follows from the very goals of creating FSR and KVP, which are the reduction in the total costs of the Ministry of Defense and FSVT to conduct R&D on the development of automation and radar equipment, on the maintenance and development of the position of radar equipment; a unified understanding of the air situation in command and control bodies of all levels; ensuring the electronic compatibility of radar and communication means RF Armed Forces and FSVT in areas of joint deployment; reduction of the type and unification of radar facilities, KSA and communication facilities, creation of uniform standards for their interface.

Since the basis FSR and KVP constitute radio-technical troops Air Force General Management creating and the use of FSR and KVP, it is advisable to assign to the commander-in-chief of the Air Force, who, as chairman of the Central Interdepartmental Commission FSR and KVP can administer FSR and KVP. The tasks of the commission should include: development of development plans FSR and KVP and coordination of research and development in this area, taking into account the main directions of improving the forces and means of radar reconnaissance of types RF Armed Forces and FSVT; pursuing a unified technical policy in the phased creation FSR and KVP, development of proposals and recommendations for the types of the RF Armed Forces and the FSVT in the areas of development of radar, automation and communication facilities, their standardization and compatibility; development of programs and plans for equipping FSR and KVP with technical means that provide a high-quality solution to peacetime and wartime problems, organization of certification, certification and licensing of technical means; coordination with the services of the Armed Forces and the FSVT of the developed normative and legal documents governing the procedure for the functioning of the FSW and KVP; coordinated planning and formation of orders for serial production, purchase of new equipment for FSR and KVP and its deployment; planning and organizing the use of FSR and KVP in the interests of all interested consumers of radar information; coordination with the types of the RF Armed Forces and the FSVT of issues related to the deployment and redeployment of radar units.

The Air Force Commander-in-Chief can exercise direct control over the creation and improvement of the FSR and KVP through the Directorate of the Air Force Radio-Technical Troops, which performs the functions of the apparatus of the Central Interdepartmental Commission.

General management of the use of FSR and KVP in air defense zones, it is advisable to impose on the commanders of the air force formations, in air defense areas - on the commanders of air defense formations, who can control the FSR and the KVP personally, through the zonal interagency commissions of the FSR and the KVP, the headquarters of the air force and air defense formations, as well as through their deputies and chiefs of radio technical troops.

The tasks of the zonal interdepartmental commission of the FSR and the KVP, the headquarters of the air force formation (air defense formations) should include: planning and organizing combat duty of a part of the forces and means of the FSR and KVP in the air defense zone (area); coordination of plans for the use of FSR and KVP in the air defense zone (area) with all interested departments; organizing and conducting training of personnel and equipment of the FSR and KVP for the implementation of the assigned tasks; organization of radar reconnaissance and airspace control of the FSR and KVP in the air defense zone (area); quality control and stability of the provision of radar information to control bodies; organization of interaction with forces and means of reconnaissance and airspace control that are not part of the FSR and KVP; coordination of issues of operation of technical means of FSR and KVP.

Structurally, the FSR and KVP control system should include control bodies, control posts, a communications system, automation equipment complexes, etc. Its basis, in our opinion, can be the control system of the Air Force radio-technical troops.

Immediate control forces and means of radar reconnaissance and airspace control should be carried out from the existing command posts of the branches of the Armed Forces and FSVT (according to departmental affiliation). At the same time, they must organize their work and the work of subordinate forces and means in accordance with the requirements of consumers of radar information on the basis of a unified planning of the use of FSR and KVP in zones and regions Air defense.

In the course of combat use, radio engineering units (radar positions) of the FSR and KVP on issues of conducting radar reconnaissance and issuing radar information should be operatively subordinate to the command and control bodies of the Air Force radio engineering forces through command posts of the corresponding branches of the Armed Forces.

In the conditions of the ever-increasing dynamism of the air and radio-electronic situation and the active influence of the opposing side on radar facilities and systems, the requirements for ensuring their effective control increase sharply. It is possible to radically solve the problem of increasing the efficiency of the use of FSR and KVP only through complex automation of management processes based on implementation new information technologies. A clear formulation of the goals of the functioning of the SDF and KVP, management tasks, the definition of target functions, the development of models adequate to control objects - these are the main problems that need to be solved when synthesizing the structure of the control system and algorithms for its functioning, the distribution of functions across the levels of the control system and determining their optimal composition.

Military thought. 1999. No. 6. S. 20-21.

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BC/ NW 2015 № 2 (27): 13 . 2

AIRSPACE CONTROL THROUGH SPACE

Klimov F.N., Kochev M. Yu., Garkin E.V., Lunkov A.P.

Precision air attack weapons, such as cruise missiles and unmanned attack aircraft, have evolved over a long range of 1,500 to 5,000 kilometers. The invisibility of such targets during flight requires their detection and identification on the acceleration trajectory. It is possible to fix such a target at a great distance, either by over-the-horizon radar stations (ZG radars), or using satellite-based radar or optical systems.

Unmanned attack aircraft and cruise missiles most often fly at speeds close to the speeds of passenger aircraft, therefore, an attack by such means can be disguised as normal air traffic. This poses for airspace control systems the task of identifying and identifying such means of attack from the moment of launch and at the maximum distance from the lines of effective destruction of them by means of aerospace forces. To solve this problem, it is necessary to apply all existing and developed systems for monitoring and monitoring the airspace, including over-the-horizon radars and satellite constellations.

The launch of a cruise missile or attack unmanned aircraft can be carried out from the torpedo launcher of a patrol boat, from the external suspension of the aircraft or from a launcher disguised as a standard sea container located on a civilian dry cargo ship, car trailer, railway platform. The satellites of the missile attack warning system are already recording and tracking the coordinates of launches of unmanned aircraft or cruise missiles in the mountains and in the ocean by the engine torch at the acceleration site. Consequently, the satellites of the missile attack warning system need to track not only the territory of a potential enemy, but also the waters of the oceans and continents globally.

The deployment of radar systems on satellites for aerospace control today is associated with technological and financial difficulties. But in modern conditions, such a new technology as broadcast automatic dependent surveillance (ADS-B) can be used to control airspace through satellites. Information from commercial aircraft via the ADS-B system can be collected using satellites by placing on board receivers operating at ADS-B frequencies and repeaters of the received information to ground-based airspace control centers. Thus, it is possible to create a global field of electronic observation of the airspace of the planet. Satellite constellations can become sources of flight information about aircraft in fairly large areas.

Information about the airspace coming from the ADS-B receivers located on the satellites makes it possible to control aircraft over the oceans and in the folds of the terrain of the mountain ranges of the continents. This information will allow us to separate and identify air attack assets from commercial aircraft.

ADS-B identification information on commercial aircraft, received via satellites, will create an opportunity to reduce the risks of terrorist attacks and sabotage in our time. In addition, such information will make it possible to detect emergency aircraft and aircraft crash sites in the ocean away from the coast.

Let us evaluate the possibility of using various satellite systems for receiving aircraft flight information via the ADS-B system and relaying this information to ground-based airspace control systems. Modern aircraft transmit flight information via the ADS-B system using onboard transponders with a power of 20 W at a frequency of 1090 MHz.

The ADS-B system operates at frequencies that freely penetrate the Earth's ionosphere. The ADS-B system transmitters located on board the aircraft have limited power, therefore, the receivers located on board the satellites must have sufficient sensitivity.

Using the energy calculation of the Airplane-Sputnik satellite communication line, we can estimate the maximum range at which it is possible to receive information by the satellite from aircraft. The peculiarity of the used satellite line is the restrictions on the weight, overall dimensions and power consumption, both of the on-board transponder of the aircraft and the on-board transponder of the satellite.

To determine the maximum range at which it is possible to receive messages by the ADS-B satellite, we will use the well-known equation for the line of satellite communication systems on the ground-satellite section:

where

- effective signal power at the transmitter output;

- effective signal power at the receiver input;

- the gain of the transmitting antenna;

- slant range from the spacecraft to the receiving ES;

- wavelength on the "DOWN" line

waves on the Down line;

- the effective area of ​​the transmitting antenna aperture;

- the transmission coefficient of the waveguide path between the transmitter and the antenna of the spacecraft;

- the efficiency of the waveguide path between the receiver and the antenna of the ES;

Transforming the formula, we find the slant range at which the satellite can receive flight information:

d = .

We substitute the parameters corresponding to the standard onboard transponder and the satellite receiver into the formula. Calculations show that the maximum transmission range on the airplane-satellite link is 2256 km. Such an oblique transmission range on the plane-satellite link is possible only when operating through low-orbit satellite constellations. At the same time, we use standard on-board aircraft equipment, without complicating the requirements for commercial aircraft.

The ground station for receiving information has significantly less restrictions on weight and dimensions than the onboard equipment of satellites and aircraft. Such a station can be equipped with more sensitive receivers and antennas with high gain. Therefore, the communication range on the satellite-ground link depends only on the conditions of the line of sight of the satellite.

Using the data of the orbits of satellite constellations, we can estimate the maximum slant communication range between the satellite and the ground receiving station by the formula:

,

where H is the altitude of the satellite orbit;

- the radius of the Earth's surface.

The results of calculating the maximum slant range for points at different geographical latitudes are presented in Table 1.

		Orbcom	Iridium	Messenger	Globalstar	Signal
Orbit altitude, km				1400	1414	1500
Radius of the Earth North Pole, km	6356,86	2994,51	3244,24	4445,13	4469,52	4617,42
Earth radius Arctic Circle, km	6365,53	2996,45	3246,33	4447,86	4472,26	4620,24
Earth radius 80 °, km	6360,56	2995,34	3245,13	4446,30	4470,69	4618,62
Earth radius 70 °, km	6364,15	2996,14	3245,99	4447,43	4471,82	4619,79
Earth radius 60 °, km	6367,53	2996,90	3246,81	4448,49	4472,89	4620,89
Earth radius 50 °, km	6370,57	2997,58	3247,54	4449,45	4473,85	4621,87
Earth radius 40 °, km	6383,87	3000,55	3250,73	4453,63	4478,06	4626,19
Earth radius 30 °, km	6375,34	2998,64	3248,68	4450,95	4475,36	4623,42
Earth radius 20 °, km	6376,91	2998,99	3249,06	4451,44	4475,86	4623,93
Earth radius 10 °, km	6377,87	2999,21	3249,29	4451,75	4476,16	4624,24
Radius of the Earth equator, km	6378,2	2999,28	3249,37	4451,85	4476,26	4624,35

The maximum transmission range on the airplane-satellite line is less than the maximum slant range on the satellite-ground line for the Orbkom, Iridium and Gonets satellite systems. The maximum data slant range is closest to the calculated maximum data transmission range for the Orbcom satellite system.

Calculations show that it is possible to create an airspace observation system using satellite relaying of ADS-B messages from aircraft to ground-based centers for summarizing flight information. Such a surveillance system will increase the range of controlled space from a ground point to 4500 kilometers without using inter-satellite communications, which will ensure an increase in the airspace control zone. By using inter-satellite communication channels, we will be able to control the airspace globally.

Fig. 1 "Airspace control using satellites"

Fig. 2 "Control of airspace with inter-satellite communication"

The proposed method of airspace control allows:

To expand the coverage area of ​​the airspace control system, including to the water area of ​​the oceans and the territory of mountain ranges up to 4500 km from the receiving ground station;

When using an inter-satellite communication system, it is possible to control the Earth's airspace globally;

Receive flight information from aircraft regardless of foreign airspace observation systems;

Select airborne objects tracked by the radar sensor according to the degree of their danger at the distant detection lines.

Literature:

1. E.A. Fedosov "Half a century in aviation". M: Bustard, 2004.

2. “Satellite communications and broadcasting. Directory. Under the editorship of L.Ya.Kantor ". M: Radio and communication, 1988.

3. Andreev V.I. “Order of the Federal Air Transport Service of the Russian Federation dated October 14, 1999. No. 80 "On the Creation and Implementation of a Broadcast Automatic Dependent Surveillance System in Civil Aviation of Russia."

4. Traskovskiy A. "Moscow Aviation Mission: Basic Principle of Safe Management". "Aviapanorama". 2008. No. 4.

Radar field is called the area of ​​space with a given height of the lower boundary, within which the radar grouping provides reliable detection, determination of the coordinates of air targets and their continuous tracking.

The radar field is formed from the radar visibility zones.

Visibility zone(detection) is the area of ​​space around the radar within which the station can detect and track airborne targets with a given probability.

Each type of radar has its own visibility zone, it is determined by the design of the radar antenna and its tactical and technical characteristics (wavelength, transmitter power and other parameters).

The following important features of the radar detection zones are noted, which must be taken into account when creating a grouping of reconnaissance units:

The border of the radar visibility zones show the target detection range depending on the target flight altitude.

The formation of the radar direction diagram, especially in the meter and decimeter range, is significantly influenced by the earth's surface.

Consequently, the terrain will have a significant impact on the radar visibility zones. Moreover, the influence of the terrain in different directions from the radar station is different. Consequently, the detection ranges of the same type of air targets at the same altitude in different directions may be different.

Detection radars are used to conduct reconnaissance of an air enemy in a circular search mode. The width of the radiation pattern of such a radar in the vertical plane is limited and is usually 20-30 °. This leads to the presence of so-called "dead craters" in the radar visibility zone, where observation of air targets is impossible.

The possibility of continuous tracking of air targets in the radar visibility zone is also influenced by reflections from local objects, as a result of which an illuminated area appears near the center of the indicator screen. Tracking targets in the area of ​​local items is difficult. Even if the radars are deployed in a position that meets the requirements for it, on medium-rugged terrain, the radius of the zone of local objects reaches 15-20 km relative to the center of the position. Turning on the equipment for protection against passive interference (system of selection of a moving target) does not completely "remove" marks from local objects from the radar screens, and with a high intensity of reflections from local objects, it is difficult to observe targets in this zone. In addition, when the radar is operating with the SDC equipment turned on, the detection range of air targets is reduced by 10-15%.

The cross-section of the radar visibility zone in the horizontal plane at a given height can be conventionally taken as a ring centered at the radar station. The outer radius of the ring is determined by the maximum detection range of an air target of this type at a given height. The inner radius of the ring is determined by the radius of the radar "dead funnel".

When creating an RLP grouping in the intelligence system, the following requirements must be met:

The maximum possible removal of confident detection in the most probable direction of enemy air raids (in front of the leading edge).

A continuous radar field should cover the space over the entire territory of the operational formation of troops, at all possible flight altitudes of the air enemy.

The probability of detecting targets at any point in a solid field must be at least 0.75.

The radar field must be highly stable.

Maximum savings in radar reconnaissance assets (number of radars).

It is necessary to dwell on the choice of the optimal value of the height of the lower boundary of the continuous radar field, since this is one of the most important conditions for the fulfillment of the listed requirements.

Two neighboring stations provide a continuous radar field only starting from a certain minimum height (H min), and the smaller the distance between the radars, the lower the lower boundary of the continuous field.

That is, the lower the height of the lower boundary of the field is set, the closer the radar needs to be located, the more the radar will be required to create the field (which contradicts the above requirements).

In addition, the lower the height of the lower boundary of the field, the smaller the offset of the zone of confident detection at this height in front of the leading edge.

The state and development trends of EHV already at the present time require the creation of a radar field in the range of heights from several tens of meters (50-60 m.).

However, to create a field with such a height of the lower boundary, a huge amount of radar equipment will be required. Calculations show that with a decrease in the height of the lower boundary of the field from 500 m to 300 m, the need for the number of radars increases by 2.2 times, and with a decrease from 500 m to 100 m - by 7 times.

In addition, there is no urgent need for a single continuous radar field with such a low altitude.

Currently, it is considered rational to create a continuous field in the front (army) zone of action by ground-based radars with a lower boundary height of 300-500 meters in front of the front edge and in tactical depth.

The height of the upper boundary of the radar field, as a rule, is not specified and is determined by the capabilities of the radars in service with the RTP.

To develop a general methodology for calculating the values ​​of intervals and distances between radar reconnaissance units by radar reconnaissance units in their single grouping, we will accept the following assumptions:

1. All units are armed with the same type of radar, each unit has one radar;

2. The nature of the terrain does not significantly affect the radar visibility zones;

Condition: Let it be required to create a continuous radar field with the height of the lower boundary "H min". The radius of the visibility zone (detection range) of the radar on "H min" is known and is equal to "D".

The task can be solved by the location of the radar in two ways:

At the tops of the squares;

At the vertices of equilateral triangles (staggered).

In this case, the RL field on "H min" will have the form (Appendix 4 and 5)

The distance between the radar will be equal to:

In the first method, d = D = 1.41 D;

For the second d = D = 1.73 D;

From a comparison of these figures, it can be concluded that the creation of a radar field by positioning the radar at the vertices of equilateral triangles (staggered) is economically more profitable, since it requires fewer stations.

A grouping of reconnaissance assets located at the corners of an equilateral triangle will be called a grouping of type "A".

While beneficial in terms of cost savings, the A-class does not provide other critical requirements. For example, failure of any of the radars leads to the formation of large dips in the radar field. Losses of air targets during wiring will be observed even if all radars are in good working order, since the "Dead craters" in the radar visibility zones are not blocked.

A grouping of type "A" has an unsatisfactory field characteristic in front of the leading edge. In areas occupying a total of over 20% of the front line width, the removal of the reconnaissance zone in front of the leading edge is 30-60% less than possible. If we also take into account the distortion of the radar visibility zones due to the influence of the nature of the terrain around the positions, then in general it is possible to draw a conclusion that the type "A" grouping can be used only in exceptional cases with an acute shortage of funds and in secondary directions in the depth of the operational formation of the front troops, but not along front lines

The appendix presents a grouping of radars, which we will conditionally call a grouping of type "B". Here the radars are also located in arshins of equilateral triangles, but with sides equal to the detection range "D" at the height of the lower boundary of the field in several lines. The intervals between the radar in the lines d = D, and the distance between the lines

C = D = 0.87 D.

At any point in the field created by the B-type grouping, the space is simultaneously viewed by three radars, and in some areas even by a family. Due to this, a high stability of the radar field and the reliability of the guidance of air targets are achieved with a detection probability close to unity. This constellation provides overlapping of radar “dead craters” and local object zones (which can be achieved only with d = D), and also excludes possible failures in the field due to distortion of the radar visibility zones due to the influence of the terrain around the position.

To ensure the continuity of the radar field in time, each radar participating in the creation of the field must work around the clock. This is not practically feasible. Therefore, at each point should be deployed not one, but two or more radars, which form the radar.

Typically, each RLP is deployed by one RLR from the orb.

To create a continuous radar line, it is advisable to arrange the radar field in several lines in a checkerboard pattern (at the vertices of equilateral triangles),

The intervals between posts must be selected based on the specified height of the lower boundary of the radar field (H min).

It is advisable to choose the intervals between the radar equal to the detection range of air targets "D" at the height "H min" of the lower boundary of the field in this area (d = D)

The distance between the radar lines should be within 0.8-0.9 of the detection range at the height of the lower boundaries of the "H min" field.

Improvement of the federal system of reconnaissance and airspace control: history, reality, prospects

At the end of the 20th century, the issue of creating a unified radar field for the country was quite acute. Multi-departmental radar systems and means, often duplicating each other and eating up colossal budgetary funds, did not meet the requirements of the country's leadership and the Armed Forces. The need to expand work in this area was obvious.

The beginning of work on the creation of a federal system of reconnaissance and control of airspace was laid by the decree of the President of the Russian Federation in 1993 "On the organization of air defense in the Russian Federation", in which the now familiar name - the federal system of reconnaissance and control of the airspace of the Russian Federation (FSR and KVP).

The Military Scientific Committee and the Directorate of Radio Technical Troops (RTV) of the Main Command of the Air Defense Forces prepared draft reports and normative legal documents, which formed the basis for the decrees of the President of the Russian Federation in 1994 "On the creation of a federal system of reconnaissance and control of the airspace of the Russian Federation" and " On approval of the Regulations on the Central Interdepartmental Commission of the Federal System of Reconnaissance and Airspace Control of the Russian Federation ”.

The FSR and KVP were entrusted with the following tasks:

• radar reconnaissance and radar control of the airspace of the Russian Federation;
• operational control of forces and means of radar reconnaissance and radar control of the airspace;
• organization of interaction between control bodies of the branches of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (RF Armed Forces) with air traffic control bodies;
• information support for command and control systems and air traffic control bodies;
• placement of radio electronic equipment on the territory of the Russian Federation on the basis of a unified technical policy.

The informational basis of the FSR and KVP was formed by the units of the air defense RTV, the air force communications and radio support troops, the naval radar surveillance, and the radar positions of the Unified Air Traffic Management System (ATM). Radar reconnaissance units of the Air Defense Forces of the Ground Forces could be used by special order.

Thus, the unified radar system of the federal system was supposed to consist of the forces and means of radar reconnaissance of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation and the Ministry of Transport of the Russian Federation, as well as a control system, collection and processing of radar information, the basis of which was the command posts (CP) of radio engineering units and formations. , reconnaissance and information centers of the command post of formations and formations (regions and zones) of the air defense.

In their development, the FSR and KVP, as its ideologists imagined, had to go through a number of stages of development, while it was necessary to maximize the potential of the radar system of the RF Armed Forces:

1st stage. Preparatory (1993).

2nd stage. Priority work on the creation of FSR and KVP (January - September 1994).

3rd stage. Deployment of the main elements of the FSR and KVP in the air defense zones (October - December 1994).

4th stage. Deployment of dual-use information elements and testing of technical means of a unified automated radar system - EA radar (1995-2001).

5th stage. Full transition to EA radar (2001-2005).

FSR and KVP were formed for two decades. Practical work on the creation of the federal system began in October 1994, when, on the instructions of the President of Russia, the Central Interdepartmental Commission of the FSR and KVP (CMVK) began to function under the leadership of the Commander-in-Chief of the Air Defense Forces, Colonel-General of Aviation V.A.Prudnikov. At the origins of the creation of the federal system were professionals in their field, military and civilian leaders and specialists in the field of air defense and ATC: V.A.Prudnikov, V.G. Shelkovnikov, V.P. Sinitsyn, V.F. Migunov, G.K. Dubrov, A. I. Aleshin, A. R. Balychev, J. V. Bezel, V. I. Mazov, A. S. Sumin, V. P. Zhila, V. K. Demedyuk, V. I. Ivasenko, V. I. Kozlov, S. N. Karas, V. M. Korenkov, A. E. Kislukha, B. V. Mikhailov, B. I. Kushneruk, N. F. Zobov, A. A. Koptsev, R. L. Danelov, N. N. Titarenko, A. I. Travnikov, A. I. Popov, B. V. Vasiliev, V. I. Zakharyin and others.

In the course of the first four stages, the coordination bodies of the federal system were created and began to work: CMVK FSR and KVP, six interdepartmental zonal commissions (for air defense zones), two interdepartmental commissions - with zonal rights (in two air defense districts in the west and east of the country).

Regulatory legal documents were developed and approved governing the creation of dual-use information elements of the FSR and KVP in air defense zones and regions: "Regulations on dual-use units of the Russian Ministry of Defense", "Regulations on dual-use positions of the Russian Ministry of Transport", General agreement between the Russian Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Transport of Russia "On the creation, functioning and operation of subdivisions and positions of dual use."

Rice. 1. Assessment of the reduction in the resource consumption of radio-electronic equipment of the Air Force RTV
Graphics by Julia GORELOVA

As a result of this work, agreements were reached between the authorized structures of the Russian Ministry of Defense and the Russian Ministry of Transport to create 30 positions and 10 dual-purpose units.

The first practical steps to create dual-use information elements of the federal system were made thanks to the perseverance and enthusiasm of the radio technical troops (RTV) specialists, who performed the functions of the CMVK apparatus, as well as the EU ATM enterprises and enterprises of the military-industrial complex (MIC).

The experience of information interaction between military and civilian command and control bodies has shown that the use of RTV dual-use units in N. Chalna settlement, Komsomolsk-on-Amur, Kyzyl, Kosh-Agach allowed to reduce the economic costs of enterprises in the interests of solving the tasks of the EU ATM by at least 25-30 percent. Radar stations (RLC) RTV type 5N87, 1L117 and P-37 were used as sources of radar information.

In turn, the use of TRLK-10 and P-37 radar at dual-use positions of the North Caucasian air traffic control center, Khabarovsk, Vladivostok, Perm, Kolpashevsky ATM centers made it possible to maintain the quality of control over the use of airspace within the boundaries of responsibility for air defense in the face of reduced personnel and the strength of the Air Force RTV.

However, the subject of the FSR and the KVP, despite the very high level of documents in accordance with which it was necessary to carry out the work, was financed within the framework of the state defense order on a leftover basis. And R&D on SDF and KVP in these years were financed at the level of 15 percent of the need.

Radio altimeter PRV-13 at one of the sites of the Kapustin Yar test site. Intended to work as a means of measuring altitude as part of the 5N87 radar complex together with other rangefinders (P-37, P-35M, 5N84, 5N84A)
Photo: Leonid YAKUTIN

As of July 1, 1997, it was not possible to conclude a single agreement (local agreement) on the creation of dual-use information elements due to the lack of real possibilities for mutual settlements between military and civilian users of radar information.

There is an urgent need to have priority funding when creating the federal system. Therefore, in December 1998, a special working group was formed from representatives of the apparatus of the Security Council of the Russian Federation, the Ministry of Defense of Russia and the Federal Aviation Service (FAS) of Russia, which prepared an analytical note on the FSR and KVP for the report to the top leadership of the country.

The note noted that the situation with the creation of the FSR and KVP poses not only a serious threat to the national security of Russia, but is also the reason for the loss of profits from possible receipts of funds to the federal budget through the FAS Russia from foreign and domestic airlines using the airspace of Russia.

It was stated that the FSR and KVP are the national treasure of Russia, one of the most important fragments of the country's unified information space. She needed immediate and comprehensive government support.

Rice. 2. Indicators of the increase in the area of ​​controlled airspace
Graphics by Julia GORELOVA

The issue was resolved at the level of the Prime Minister of the Russian Federation E.M. Primakov. In the shortest possible time, the materials of the analytical note were reviewed at all levels and instructions for further actions were given. The Russian Ministry of Defense, together with the departments concerned, prepared and agreed on the draft of the necessary documents, and in August 1999, a decree of the President of the Russian Federation was issued "On priority measures of state support for the federal system of reconnaissance and control of the airspace of the Russian Federation."

The decree identified state customers and the main contractor for improving the unified radar system of the FSR and KVP. The Government of the Russian Federation was instructed to ensure the development and approve in 1999 of the Federal Target Program (FTP) for improving the SDF and KVP for 2000–2010, providing for the financing of this program at the expense of the federal budget.

For several years, the draft FTP was considered, corrected, clarified, reduced, supplemented, but not submitted to the government for consideration. In 2001, the Main Control Directorate of the President of the Russian Federation became interested in how the decisions made on the creation of the FSR and KVP were implemented, and checked the state of affairs.

The audit showed that the government and a number of ministries (the Russian Ministry of Defense, the Federal Antimonopoly Service of the Russian Federation, the Russian Ministry of Economic Development, the Russian Ministry of Finance) did not take appropriate measures to comply with the adopted regulatory legal acts. The state of affairs on the creation of the FSR and KVP was recognized as unsatisfactory and not meeting the requirements of national security. It was recommended that urgent measures be taken to remedy the situation. However, even such a harsh assessment did not change the situation for the better.

At the same time, life did not stand still. Troops and enterprises for the use of airspace and air traffic control needed to be given some kind of tool for equipping dual-use information elements with dual-use route radar systems (TRLK DN).

Specialists from interested structures of the Russian Ministry of Defense, the Russian Ministry of Transport and the Ministry of Economic Development of Russia prepared a draft decision on the shared financing of equipping dual-use route radar positions (TRLP DN), which was submitted by the Air Force Commander-in-Chief for approval to the heads of the Russian Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Transport of the Russian Federation.

PRV-13 was also used as part of the automated radio engineering units of the automated control systems 5N55M (Mezha-M), 5N53-N (Nizina-N), 5N53-U (Nizina-U) of the Luch-2 (3) system , 86Zh6 ("Field"), 5N60 ("Base") of the "Luch-4" system. PRV-13 were interfaced with the objects of the automated control system "Air-1M", "Air-1P" (with the equipment for reading and transmitting data of the ASPD and the equipment for instrumental guidance "Kaskad-M"), with the automated control system for the air defense systems ASURK-1MA, ASURK-1P and the cabin K -9 ZRS S-200
Photo: Leonid YAKUTIN

The decision was approved in November 2003. Starting from 2004, it was planned to finance equipping the air traffic control system on the basis of equity participation within the framework of the state defense order and the subprogram "Unified air traffic management system" of the FTP "Modernization of the transport system of Russia (2002-2010)" ...

TRLK DN "Lira-T" produced by JSC "Lianozovsky Electromechanical Plant" was identified as equipment for equipping TRLP DN. In accordance with this decision, taking into account the absence of FTP on FSR and KVP, the work was carried out over several years. The main technical solutions for equipping the TRLK DN "Lira-T" were tested during state tests at TRLP DN Velikiye Luki. For the period 2004-2006 more than a dozen TRLP DN were equipped: in 2004 - Omolon, Markovo, Kepervey, Pevek, M. Schmidt; in 2005 - Okhotsk, Okha, Nakhodka, Arkhara; in 2006 - m. Kamenny, Polyarny, Dalnerechensk, Ulan-Ude.

The work done made it possible to have 45 dual-use information elements by the end of 2006 (33 percent of the approved lists). This result was achieved to a large extent thanks to the active position of the CMVK, which in different years was headed by the current commanders-in-chief of the Air Defense Forces, and since 1998 - by the Air Force.

The main burden of organizational and technical support for the creation of the FSR and KVP fell on the apparatus of the CMVK, the functions of which were carried out by the RTV Directorate. In 2003, the center of this very important work was the specially created 136th coordination and regulatory department (KNO) of the FSR and the KVP of the Air Force.

The management of the department was entrusted to A.E. Kislukha, who since 1994 was the executive secretary of the CMVK and led the functional direction of work on the creation of elements of the federal system in the RTV Directorate of the Main Command of the Air Defense Forces, and later in the Air Force.

The formation of the KNO, of course, removed a number of problems of coordinating the work of various departments, but the department did not solve the main task of testing technical means. Due to this and a number of other reasons, it was not possible to solve the main task of technical re-equipment with dual-use means and the transition to EA radar by 2005. The determining factor was the lack of targeted funding for research, development and serial deliveries of dual-use technical means to improve the FSR and KVP.

Only in January 2006, by an order of the government of the Russian Federation, the concept of the federal target program “Improvement of the federal system of reconnaissance and control of the airspace of the Russian Federation for the period up to 2010” was approved, and then in June of the same year, the government of the Russian Federation issued Decree No. 345 “On federal target program "Improvement of the federal system of reconnaissance and control of the airspace of the Russian Federation (2007–2010)".

ST-68UM three-coordinate combat mode radar (centimeter range)
Photo: Leonid YAKUTIN

A lot of work on the preparation of draft documents was carried out by the leaders and specialists of the Air Force High Command: A.V.Boyarintsev, A.I. Aleshin, G.I.Nimira, A.V. Pankov, S.V. Grinko, specialists of the production and technological policy department and civil products (PTP PGN) JSC "Concern Air Defense" Almaz-Antey ": G. P. Bendersky, A. I. Ponomarenko, E. G. Yakovlev, V. V. Khramov, O. O. Gapotchenko, heads and specialists of the Ministry of Transport of the Russian Federation: A.V.Shramchenko, D.V.Savitsky, E.A. Voytovsky, N.N. Titarenko, N.I. »: V. R. Gulchenko, V. M. Libov, K. K. Kaplya, V. V. Zakharov, K. V. Elistratov.

The concept for the development of the FSR and the KVP of the Russian Federation for the period up to 2015 and beyond has determined the main directions of the organizational, military-technical and economic policy for the development of the FSR and the KVP in the interests of solving the tasks of the aerospace defense, organizing air traffic and suppressing terrorist acts and other illegal actions in airspace of the Russian Federation.

The concept reflects the agreed positions of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, the Ministry of Transport of the Russian Federation, as well as other interested federal executive bodies on the main directions of development and application of the FSR and KVP in peacetime.

Ideologically, the new stages in the development of the FSR and KVP were recognized. In its development, the FSR and KVP must go through five main stages:

• Stage I - 1994-2005;
• Stage II - 2006–2010;
• Stage III - short term (2011–2015);
• Stage IV - mid-term perspective (2016–2020);
• Stage V - long-term perspective (after 2020).

At stage I From the moment of the creation of the FSR and the KVP, the principle of the coordinated use of radar equipment of the Ministry of Defense of Russia and the Ministry of Transport of Russia in the areas of joint deployment was taken as the basis for building the federal system in accordance with the regulatory legal documents in force at that time. The implementation of this principle was achieved by centralized (unified) planning of the use of radar equipment in air defense zones (areas).

At the same time, the exchange of information on the air situation between the dual-use radio engineering units (RTP DN) of the Russian Ministry of Defense and the regional centers of the EU ATM, as well as between the dual-use radar positions (RLP DN) of the Ministry of Transport of Russia and the radio engineering units of the Air Force and the Navy was carried out mainly in a non-automated way.

The source of funding for the work related to the creation and use of subdivisions and positions of dual use were funds received by the Ministry of Transport of Russia at the expense of air navigation fees, as well as funds allocated by the Ministry of Defense of Russia for the construction and maintenance of the RF Armed Forces.

The lack of a mechanism for targeted financing of measures to create the FSR and the KVP did not allow organizing the use of information about the air situation from the RLP of the EU ATM located in areas where the air defense forces of the Russian Defense Ministry do not create a radar field. This factor, as well as the lack of information and technical interaction (interface) of the automated systems of the EU ATM and air defense bodies did not lead to a significant increase in the efficiency of the functioning of the FSR and STC.

Stage II After many years of efforts, the creation and development of the FSR and KVP finally achieved guaranteed government support for the deployment of the FSR and KVP within the framework of the FTP “Improvement of the FSR and KVP RF (2007–2010)”.

Three main areas of activity were planned:

1. Comprehensive work to improve the SDF and KVP, including:

• development of project documentation for information interaction between the EU ATM centers and air defense control bodies;
• development of documentation for the reconstruction of the EU ATM centers;
• development of design documentation for the reconstruction of dual-use en-route radar positions of the EU ATM.

2. Reconstruction of the EU ATM en-route dual-use radar positions.

3. Reconstruction of ES ATM centers in terms of equipping SITV with air defense control bodies.

The main task of the FTP is to create the material and technical base of the FSR and KVP in the Central, North-Western and Eastern regions of the Russian Federation by equipping the TC of the EU ATM with information and technical interaction systems (SITV) with air defense control bodies, as well as modernizing the radar of the Ministry of Transport of Russia for their implementation functions of dual purpose.

The overall coordination of the activities of the FSR and the KVP at the second stage of its development was entrusted to the Interdepartmental Commission for the Use and Control of the Airspace of the Russian Federation, formed by the decree of the President of the Russian Federation in 2006.

The publication in 2008 of the decree of the President of the Russian Federation "On measures to improve the management of the federal system of reconnaissance and control of the airspace of the Russian Federation" became a significant help in the work.

The decree legally consolidated the organizational and technical changes in the field of FSR and KVP, which actually occurred after the emergence of a new coordinating body represented by the Interdepartmental Commission for the Use and Control of the Airspace of the Russian Federation (MVK IVP and KVP), and also established that the only supplier (lead executor) when placing orders for the supply of goods, performance of work, provision of services for state needs in the interests of the country's defense and the state economy in the use, reconnaissance and control of the airspace of the Russian Federation, the Almaz-Antey Air Defense Concern is OJSC.

During the implementation of the FTP, much attention was paid to the issue of creating a SITV, to achieve the effectiveness of which a standard structural diagram of SITV of the EU ATM centers with control bodies and air defense command was developed. The scheme provides for the implementation of two methods for issuing information about the air situation from dual-use information elements: centralized and decentralized.

To organize the direct interaction of the EU ATM center with the air defense authorities, an interaction dispatcher is assigned from the combat crew of the duty shift of the air defense unit's command post. The workstation of the controller for interaction with air defense units is installed in the ATM center and includes technical means for displaying radar and dispatch information and means for communication with officials of the ATM center and the command post of the air defense unit.

This decision has stood the test of time (1999-2005). The so-called elbow interaction of the officers of the control bodies of the air defense command post with the dispatchers was carried out directly at the centers of the EU ATM in the air defense zones. The proposed technical solutions within the FTP significantly increase the possibilities of interaction.

The technical solution to the problem of information and technical interaction is based on a set of software and hardware tools (CPTS), which allows receiving radar and scheduling information from automated air traffic control systems (ATC AS) of the EU ATM centers, as well as receiving, processing and combining radar information from TRLP LT, which are part of the ES ATM center, for subsequent transfer to the automation systems of the air defense command post.

The SITV technical means also include remote sets of subscriber equipment (VKAO), complexes for communication and air data transmission (KSSPD). The methodological apparatus for the design and assessment of indicators and indicators of the FTP, which was used in the design of the FTP activities, was developed in the 2nd Central Research Institute of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, the State Research Institute "Aeronavigation" and the STC "Promtekhaero".

To carry out the complex of works stipulated by the FTP, a cooperation of co-executors was created in JSC Concern PVO Almaz-Antey, which included more than 10 enterprises and organizations. A large amount of work in the main areas of activity was carried out by the Department of PTP PGN, MNIIPA, VNIIRA, the company "NITA", NPO "Lianozovsky Electromechanical Plant", STC "Promtekhaero", LOTES-TM, "Radiofizika", State Research Institute "Aeronavigation", 24th NEIU and the 2nd Central Research Institute of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation.

In order to reconstruct the TRLP DN on the basis of the requirements of the Ministry of Defense of Russia and the Ministry of Transport of Russia, the NPO Lianozovsky Electromechanical Plant OJSC has specially developed and successfully passed the state tests TRLK DN "Sopka-2".

TRLK DN "Sopka-2" is designed to equip dual-purpose radar positions of the Ministry of Transport of Russia and provide radar information to the RF Armed Forces launchers involved in peacetime on air defense combat duty, to solve detection tasks, measure three coordinates, assess movement parameters, determine nationality air objects, as well as receiving additional (flight) information and receiving signals "Alarm" ("Distress") from aircraft located in its area of ​​operation, and issuing generalized information about the air situation to display means or to the ATC AS ATM and to CP (PU) of the RF Armed Forces.

The work carried out during the II stage of the deployment of SITV in nine centers of the EU ATM (Moscow, Khabarovsk, Vladivostok, Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky, Magadansky, Yakutsk, Rostov, St. -The western regions of the country are fragments of a unified radar system of the FSR and KVP, built on the principle of information and technical interaction of departmental radar systems of the Russian Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Transport of Russia.

At the same time, the exchange of information on the air situation between the ES ATM centers, equipped with SITV, and the command post of the aerospace defense brigades is carried out in an automated mode, and at most of the modernized positions, the airborne missile systems are deployed, which include equipment for state identification of the EU GRLO and measuring the flight altitude of the observed AOs. The work carried out at the second stage to improve the FSR and KVP made it possible to increase the area of ​​the airspace controlled by the Ministry of Defense of Russia (at an altitude of 1000 meters) by more than 1.7 million square meters. km, reduce the resource consumption of radio electronic equipment of the Russian Ministry of Defense by almost 1.4 million hours and ensure the required level of air traffic safety by reducing the risk of accidents from 13x10 -7 to 4x10 -7.

The end follows.

Alexander KISLUKHA