Causes and periodization of the war. The origins of the most terrible war in the history of mankind lay in irreconcilable contradictions between world powers. The leadership of Nazi Germany expected not only to return the territories lost under the Treaty of Versailles, but also dreamed of world domination. The ruling circles of Italy and Japan, dissatisfied with the results of participation in the First World War, in their opinion, insufficient, now focused on a new ally - Germany. Many countries of Central and of Eastern Europe- Finland, Hungary, Romania, Slovakia and Bulgaria, whose leaders joined, as it seemed to them, the camp of future winners.
Playing a key role in the League of Nations, England and France were unable to stop the aggressors, they largely pandered to their designs. The attempts of Western politicians to direct Germany's aggression to the east turned out to be short-sighted. Hitler took advantage of their desire to put an end to the communist ideology and its bearer - the Soviet Union, in order to provide favorable conditions for Germany to start a war. Just as short-sighted was the policy of the ruling circles of Poland, on the one hand, together with Germany, participating in the partition of Czechoslovakia, and on the other, counting on effective help from England and France in the event of Hitlerite aggression.
The Soviet leadership in the coming war expected to conduct military operations on enemy territory. The victory of the Red Army could push the process of the collapse of the "world of capitalism." Stalin, on the eve of the war, having agreed with Germany, hoped - by building up military power and foreign policy maneuvers - to include Soviet Union territories lost during the civil war Russian Empire.
World War II can be divided into four periods. They differed from each other in whose side the strategic initiative was, the results of military operations, as well as the internal situation in the warring countries.
The initial period (1939-1941): the aggression of Germany and Italy in Europe and North Africa, the establishment of the hegemony of the fascist states in continental Europe, the territorial expansion of the USSR.
The beginning of the Great Patriotic War and the expansion of the Second World War (summer 1941 - autumn 1942): the treacherous attack of Germany on the USSR and Japan on the USA, the formation of the Anti-Hitler coalition. This period was characterized by the greatest successes of the aggressor states. At the same time, the plans of the "blitzkrieg" collapsed, the aggressors faced the need to wage a protracted war.
A radical change in the course of the war (end of 1942-1943): the collapse of the offensive strategy of Germany and its satellites, the strengthening of the Anti-Hitler coalition, the strengthening of the resistance movement in the occupied territories. During this period, the USSR and its allies surpassed the fascist bloc in the production of military equipment, their armed forces carried out successful offensive operations on all fronts.
The end of World War II (1944-1945): the liberation of Europe and South-East Asia from the invaders, their final defeat. This period was characterized by the strengthening of the position of the USSR and the USA on the world stage, their struggle to secure their positions in the post-war world.
Preparing the USSR for war. The military fire blazing in Europe could not bypass the Soviet Union. This was understood by the leadership of the USSR, which took a number of measures to prepare the country for war. However, serious mistakes were made in doing so. A sharp increase in military appropriations (from 25.6% of the budget expenditures in 1939 to 43.4% in 1941) was not effective enough due to miscalculations in their distribution. Thus, despite a significant increase in capital investments directed to the basic sectors of the economy, the growth in the production of such important types of products as steel, cement, oil, coal, electricity, and building materials turned out to be insignificant. 
Attempts by the Soviet leadership to increase labor productivity in industry through the use of administrative resources did not bring the expected results. The Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on the transition to an eight-hour working day, a seven-day working week and on the prohibition of the unauthorized departure of workers and employees from enterprises and institutions, adopted in June 1940, hit hard not only on violators of discipline, but also on the least socially protected strata population: single mothers, working youth, etc.
The situation in the industry was complicated by the mass repressions of the late 1930s, during which enterprises lost a significant part of their managerial and engineering personnel. Young specialists who came from the institute's bench could not completely replace the departed cadres. In addition, many leading designers of military equipment died or ended up in camps. Just before the war, some of those imprisoned (A. N. Tupolev, S. P. Korolev, V. P. Glushko, P. O. Sukhoi) got the opportunity to work in closed design bureaus. Thus, the release of new military equipment was difficult, besides, it was too slowly introduced into production. For example, submachine guns by V. A. Degtyarev and G. S. Shpagin, T-34 and KV tanks entered the army with a delay. The situation with aviation was more prosperous: on the eve of the war, the production of Il-4 bombers, Yak-1 and MiG-3 fighters, and other equipment began.
The replacement of the territorial-militia system of formation of the armed forces by universal military duty made it possible to more than triple the size of the Red Army. However, the repressions, which weakened the command staff, gave rise to serious problems in command and control. The qualifications of the officers who replaced the comrades who were out of action was low. The staffing of new formations with equipment, means of communication and other materials was insufficient.
Soviet-Finnish war. On September 28, 1939, having concluded an agreement on friendship and borders with Germany, the USSR annexed the Western Ukrainian and Western Belarusian lands, as well as the Bialystok region inhabited by Poles, which were part of the Russian Empire before the First World War. The next country after Poland, which fell into the sphere of geopolitical and sovereign interests of Stalin, was Finland. In the autumn of 1939, the Soviet leadership presented this country with a number of ultimatum demands, the main of which were the establishment of a new border on the Karelian Isthmus and the lease of the island of Hanko. The purpose of the Soviet proposals was to ensure the security of Leningrad and to close the entrance to the Gulf of Bothnia for the ships of a potential enemy.
In November 1939, after Finland refused to meet Soviet demands, the war broke out. The offensive operation of the Red Army, which had as its goal the advance into the depths of enemy territory, developed unsuccessfully. Captured by a patriotic impulse, the Finnish troops stubbornly defended themselves. Sweden, England, France, the United States provided Finland with ammunition, military equipment and equipment. Volunteers from other countries fought on her side.
The ratio of troops that took part in the hostilities
The most fierce battles took place in the area of the defensive Mannerheim Line, which blocked the Karelian Isthmus. Parts of the Red Army, which did not have experience in breaking through long-term fortifications, suffered heavy losses in manpower and equipment. Only at the end of February 1940 did the Soviet troops, under the leadership of Commander S.K. Timoshenko, penetrate deeply into the enemy's defenses. Despite the fact that France and England promised Finland to send their troops to help, the Finns asked for peace. According to the Moscow Peace Treaty, signed on March 2, 1940, Finland ceded to the Soviet Union the entire Karelian Isthmus with Vyborg and the area to the north Lake Ladoga, the USSR received a 30-year lease on a naval base on the Hanko Peninsula. The Karelian ASSR was transformed into the Karelian-Finnish SSR (in 1956 it was returned the status autonomous republic).
The Soviet-Finnish war, nicknamed "winter" by contemporaries, had a negative impact on the foreign policy position of the USSR. The Soviet Union, as an aggressor state, was expelled from the League of Nations. Many people in the West equated Stalin and Hitler. The results of the war prompted the leadership of Finland to act in June 1941 on the side of Germany against the USSR. Another consequence was the increased conviction of the Führer and his generals in the weakness of the Red Army. The German military command stepped up preparations for a "blitzkrieg" against the USSR.
Meanwhile, the ideas of the Germans about the military weakness of the USSR turned out to be illusory. The Soviet leadership took into account the lessons of the difficult Finnish campaign. S. K. Timoshenko became People's Commissar of Defense instead of K. E. Voroshilov. Although the measures to strengthen the combat capability taken by the new leadership of the Red Army were belated, in June 1941 the Red Army was a much more combat-ready force than at the beginning of the "winter war".
Further territorial expansion of the USSR. Secret agreements with Hitler allowed Stalin to carry out further territorial acquisitions without any problems. The entry into the Soviet Union of the three Baltic countries - Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, as well as Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, was the result of both the use of measures of diplomatic and military pressure, and the use of local political forces oriented towards the USSR. 
In September 1939, the USSR offered the Baltic countries to conclude agreements on mutual military assistance. Diplomatic pressure on the neighbors was intensified by the deployment of a powerful group of Soviet troops on the border with Estonia, ten times superior to the forces of the Estonian army. The governments of the Baltic States yielded to the pressure and agreed to sign the treaties. In accordance with them, by May 1940, units of the Red Army (67 thousand people) were stationed in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania at military bases provided by their authorities, which exceeded the total number of armies of the Baltic states.
In June 1940, when the troops of the Anglo-French coalition were defeated in the west, the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the USSR charged the authorities of the Baltic countries with activities hostile to the Soviet garrisons. Unable to get help from the West, the governments of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were forced to agree to the introduction of additional Red Army forces into their territory. Demonstrations organized by the left forces and openly supported by the Soviet troops led to a change of governments. During the parliamentary elections, held under the control of Soviet representatives, pro-communist forces won. The Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian Soviet republics proclaimed by the new legislative authorities were admitted to the USSR in August 1940.
In June 1940, the USSR demanded from Romania the return of Bessarabia, which was lost in 1918, and the transfer of Northern Bukovina, whose population was mainly Ukrainians. Romania was forced to cede these territories to the Soviet Union. In August 1940, the Moldavian ASSR, together with Bessarabia attached to it, was transformed into a union republic, Northern Bukovina became part of the Ukrainian SSR.
Foreign policy successes made it possible to move the western border of the USSR, thereby securing the industrial centers of the European part of the country. However, shortly after the start of the Great Patriotic War the negative consequences of such a rapid territorial expansion also appeared. Defensive structures
on the old border were dismantled, and there was not enough time to build new ones. As a result of repressions against the population of the annexed territories, the rear of the units covering the new border turned out to be unreliable. The Soviet-German border turned out to be even longer, which in June 1941 became the starting point for the Nazi offensive deep into the USSR.
However, the most serious miscalculation was made by the Soviet leadership in assessing the timing of a future war with Germany. The ease with which Stalin took advantage of the fruits of the division of Eastern Europe into spheres of influence between the USSR and Germany allowed him to expect that the inevitable war with a powerful western neighbor could be delayed at least until 1942. The consequence of these calculations was that Stalin did not want to believe the reports of Soviet intelligence about the impending German attack. At the same time, the USSR, despite delays in payments by the German side, continued to fully fulfill its obligations to supply Germany with strategic raw materials and food.
The approach of war was already felt from the second half of the 1930s. Defense funding increased sharply: in 1939 a quarter of the state budget went to defense, in 1940 - a third, in 1941 - 43.4%. For 3.5 years on the eve of the war, the output of military products increased by 4 times. As a result, on the eve of the war, the defense industry was able to produce more than 6 thousand tanks and about 10 thousand aircraft per year, which was 1.5 times the capacity of the tank and aviation industries of Nazi Germany. A program was widely implemented to create new models of weapons and military equipment: KV and T-34 tanks, MIG-3, IL-2, Yak-1, PE-2 aircraft, BM-13 (Katyusha), 76-mm rocket launchers and other artillery pieces.
In the Urals, Siberia, Central Asia, the fuel and energy base developed at an accelerated pace, stocks of raw materials accumulated. The opening of the "second Baku" - a new oil-producing region between the Volga and the Urals - was of great importance. Particular attention was paid to the metallurgical industry - the basis of military production. The so-called "understudy plants" (branches of plants in the European part of the USSR) were created in the Urals, in Western Siberia, Central Asia - in areas beyond the reach of aviation of a potential enemy. By the summer of 1941, almost 1/5 of all military factories were already located there. At the end of 1940, a network of factory apprenticeship schools (FZO) and vocational schools began to form for the annual training of 1 million reserve workers.
In agriculture, the tasks of strengthening the country's defense capability were also taken into account. The sowing of industrial crops was expanded, measures were taken to increase the sown area and increase grain production in Siberia and Kazakhstan. By the beginning of 1941. significant food stocks were created. The appeal of Pasha Angelina - "Girls to the tractor!"
On June 26, 1940, the Decree of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR was adopted on the transition from a 7-hour working day with two days off to an 8-hour working day with one day off, as well as on the prohibition of unauthorized transfer of workers and employees from one enterprise and institution to another.
On the eve of the war, the state concentrated in its hands all possible and impossible cash. So, in 1939, methods of management were again tightened in the agrarian sector. According to the Law on Agricultural Tax, collective farmers were obliged to pay the state for every fruit tree and every garden bed of their subsidiary plots, regardless of the harvest. Farm plots were cut from collective farmers and 2.5 million hectares of the best land were taken away.
In 1940, by the Decree of the Council of People's Commissars of October 2, tuition fees were introduced in grades 8-10 of a secondary school in the amount of 150-200 rubles. per year, and for university students - 300-500 rubles. per year, which was explained by the "growing welfare of the people." Considering that the average salary was then 335 rubles. per month, and the actual earnings of workers after industrialization loans, etc. - no more than 150 rubles, it will become clear that this was a significant obstacle to education. After the Decree was put into effect, 20% of secondary school students in the RSFSR dropped out of school.
To speed up gold mining in Kolyma, a special trust "Dalstroy" is being created. Gold mining in Kolyma increases sharply from 5.5 tons in 1934 to 66.7 tons in 1939.
The Red Army underwent serious changes before the war. According to the law "On universal military duty" (September 1939), the draft age was reduced from 21 to 18 years. The term of service was increased: in the ground forces - from two to three years; in the Navy - from three to five years. These measures made it possible to increase the size of the Red Army from 1.9 million people in 1939 to 5.4 million people by June 22, 1941.
In 1940, the formation of 9 mechanized corps began, in the spring of 1941 - another 20 corps, but there were an acute shortage of tanks and personnel to complete them. Military aviation was also in the process of being refurbished. By the beginning of the war, old-type aircraft accounted for about 80% of the aircraft fleet. The Red Army was still in the process of rearmament, still incomplete, although there had been more than enough time since the beginning of World War II.
Nazi Germany was able to use 22 months from September 1, 1939 to June 22, 1941. incomparably more effective than the Stalinist leadership, whose attention was riveted not so much to systematic work to strengthen the defense capability, but to the implementation of foreign policy expansion in the West and to a difficult, bloody war with tiny Finland.
In connection with the acquisition of new territories, Stalin ordered the dismantling of a multi-hundred-kilometer line of fortifications with pillboxes, bunkers, dugouts, minefields, trenches and trenches, which bore the name of Stalin. Successful construction of new fortified areas began on new frontier. In addition, mobilization stocks were relocated to it: artillery depots, ammunition, small arms, fuel, etc.
The enormous efforts made by the Soviet people for the accelerated buildup of the military-industrial potential were largely nullified by the situation of physical and moral terror. Many designers and engineers were arrested, some of them later worked in special design bureaus formed from prisoners (“sharashkas”). In 1937, the country's best design bureau of A. Tupolev, capable of producing any type of aircraft, was destroyed. (“The pest Tupolev will be replaced by 100,000 new devoted Tupolevs!”). On October 21, 1937, he ended up in prison. A similar fate befell the design bureau of N. Polikarpov, who remained at large with a small handful of associates. Behind bars were the rising stars of aircraft design thought - A. Kalinin, R. di Bartini and others. And as an epilogue to the struggle with scientists and designers - the removal from the post of the People's Commissar of Arms of the USSR B. Vannikov and his imprisonment 2 weeks before the start of the war. Entire branches of the defense industry were in a fever due to repression.
As a result, the USSR was late with the transfer of the economy to a military footing and the reorganization of the army, in addition, this work itself was accompanied by major mistakes and miscalculations. The production of new models of military equipment was delayed, and their adoption for service. By Stalin's voluntaristic decisions just before the war, the 76-mm and 45-mm guns, which were supposed to serve as the main means of fighting enemy tanks, were taken out of production. By June 1941, there were more than 1,500 new tanks, but the tankers did not have time to master them.
The program for the construction and reconstruction of airfields in the European part of the country was not completed. It was decided to build 190 airfields there, but because of poverty they were not built, but the dismantled equipment of the old ones was transferred to the new border, and the planes were relocated to unprotected civilian airfields. In addition, the airfields were relocated too close to the new western border and the aircraft on them became easy prey for the enemy. During the first day of the war alone, aviation lost about 1200 aircraft at once, and 800 of them were destroyed on the ground.
The mass extermination of Red Army cadres had a detrimental effect on the preparations for the war. By 1941, 92.9% of the military leaders who graduated from either the tsarist or the Soviet academy were destroyed and repressed. Of the 80 members of the Supreme Military Council, 75 were repressed, 3 of the 5 marshals of the USSR were shot, and 15 of the 16 army commanders. Until the mid-30s, as a result of purges of the command staff, 47 thousand people were dismissed from the army, many of them were destroyed or ended up in camps . Then, only in 1937-1938. repression put out of action 43 thousand commanders. In 1939-1941. and even during the war, repression continued. The Red Army turned out to be "criminally weakened." “Without the thirty-seventh year,” Marshal of the Soviet Union A. Vasilevsky stated, “perhaps there would have been no war at all in 1941. In the fact that Hitler decided to start a war ... a great role was played by the assessment of the degree of defeat of the military personnel that we had.
A direct consequence of the repressions was a sharp drop in the level of Soviet military art. In the USSR, subsequently repressed military leaders (Tukhachevsky, Triandaffilov and others), for the first time in the world, the theory of deep enveloping operations was developed, mechanized brigades and corps were first created. However, in the second half of the 1930s the development of military art was not only stopped, but also reversed: Stalin's marshals and their comrades-in-arms who survived the repressions always, in the words of the writer V. Astafyev, "prepared the previous war." The “great strategist” Stalin was also in solidarity with them.
General I. Petrov spoke about the 41st: it was possible to prevent such a deep invasion of the enemy, the concentration of his large forces in narrow areas, the deep wedging of the Germans and their movement along the roads. “The Nazis showed all this in battles with Poland and France. Everyone saw and knew it. So it was necessary to prepare the army for such battles. Learn to cut those wedges!”.
However, Stalin's military doctrine in the pre-war years proceeded from the premise that any aggressor must be defeated by a powerful blow from the Red Army on its own territory and with little bloodshed. In determining the direction of the main attack of the aggressor in a future war, Stalin also made unforgivable mistakes. Contrary to comprehensive intelligence data, he was confident that Germany could deliver the main blow to the southwest through Ukraine to capture important raw materials, industrial and agricultural regions of the USSR and demanded that our main forces be concentrated there, while significantly weakening the western direction. This was a major strategic miscalculation of the leader, because. the Nazis delivered the decisive blow through Belarus, as the military leaders of the 41st had expected. On this occasion, however, there is another opinion, which is that Stalin actually intended to strike himself at the Wehrmacht, Europe - precisely from the southwest, at Hitler's oil bases in Romania.
On the eve of the war, great damage was done to Soviet diplomacy and intelligence. Special agencies repressed 140 diplomats and shot four deputy people's commissars of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The residence of the Soviet foreign intelligence in Berlin had sources of information about the most important objects in Germany and obtained the most valuable information about the military intentions of the Wehrmacht. All these materials were systematized, rechecked, analyzed, sent to the top leadership and reported personally to Stalin. Stalin, due to his paranoid qualities, arrogantly and short-sightedly ignored the messages of his own patriot intelligence officers from all over the world: R. Sorge from Japan, L. Manevich and L. Trepler from Europe, E. Sinitsyn, an intelligence resident from Finland, B. Zhuravlev, a resident from Italy and many others, who, according to Beria, should have been "erased into camp dust." Stalin did not trust diplomats, intelligence agents, marshals, or the entire Soviet people.
Thus, the Soviet Union in socio-economic, military and information terms was largely prepared for a big war, and the origins of the tragic miscalculations of the Soviet leadership in 1939-1941. rooted in the totalitarian system established in the country.
In addition, at the turn of the 20th-21st centuries, a number of researchers, starting with V. Suvorov (Rezun), are increasingly inclined to conclude that Stalin, never trusting Hitler, developed his own plan to seize Europe and, for this purpose, fanned the fire of a European war . He did not doubt success and, according to I. Bunich, scheduled the offensive for July 10, 1941. The first mayor of Moscow G. Popov wrote about this in his book “Three Wars of Stalin”: “... specifically in 1941, Stalin already planned to start war with Hitler, most likely in the second half of July 1941. The operation was codenamed "Thunderstorm".
On the readiness of the Red Army for war in June 1941
Versions of Stalin's miscalculation in the timing of a likely German attack on the USSR as the main reason for our failures are accompanied by the assertion that our troops in 1941, before the war, were not inferior to the Wehrmacht in their ability to fight, in professionalism, and if they were put on alert in time, they they would successfully repel the attack of the aggressors. At the same time, combat readiness is understood only as the ability of troops to occupy the deployment lines on alert, missing the main component of combat readiness - the ability to successfully complete the combat mission of repelling a surprise attack, which, with such an army’s skill, will not be sudden.
Many consider the very fact of their defeats to be the main "evidence" of our troops not being put on alert before aggression, although there is no direct connection here. Instead of vague allegations that the troops were not put on alert, it would be time to define a specific list of the main measures that had to be taken to achieve the required readiness before the war. And to reveal - which of them were carried out before the war, On time; what was not done and how it affected the outcome of the first battles.
In 1935-1941. The leadership of the USSR carried out a number of major measures to increase the combat readiness of the Soviet Armed Forces:
1) transfer of the Red Army in 1935-1939. on a staffing basis;
2) the introduction of universal conscription in 1939;
3) creation and deployment of serial production of a new generation of tanks and aircraft in 1939-1941, before the war;
4) strategic mobilization deployment of the Armed Forces in 1939-1941. from the peacetime army to the wartime army (before the war), from 98 divisions to 303 divisions;
5) creation and concentration on the western borders in 1939-1941. cover armies of 186 divisions, unprecedented in the history of mankind for peacetime, taking into account 16 divisions of the second strategic echelon that arrived in the cover army before the war;
6) preparation of the Western theater for war - airfields, fortified areas, roads.
In April-June 1941, with the growing threat of war, additional urgent measures were taken to increase combat readiness, including:
The call in April-May of 793 thousand reservists to replenish the troops of the western military districts almost to the state of wartime;
Directive of the Chief of the General Staff dated April 14 on the urgent putting into combat readiness of all long-term firing structures, fortified areas with the installation of field troops weapons in them in the absence of service weapons;
From May 13, covert transfer from the internal districts of troops of the second strategic echelon to the western districts, while bringing them to combat readiness - 7 armies 66 divisions (16, 19, 20, 22, 24 and 28 armies, 41st rifle, 21st th and 23rd mechanized corps);
Bringing into combat readiness 63 divisions of the reserves of the western districts and nominating them by night marches, covertly, from June 12, to the cover armies of these districts (NPO Directive of 12.6.41);
Bringing to combat readiness and covert withdrawal under the guise of exercises in the place of concentration of 52 divisions of the second echelon of the covering army from the places of permanent deployment (Order of NPO dated 16.6.41);
The withdrawal of divisions of the first echelon of the covering armies to fortified areas according to the telegram of the Chief of the General Staff of 10.6.41 and the Instruction of the People's Commissar of Defense of 11.6.41 - from the beginning of June;
Bringing all troops of the PribOVO and OdVO into readiness 18-21.6.41;
Creation from April 1941 of command posts and their occupation on June 18-21 by urgently formed front departments;
Creation of an army group by S.M. Budyonny on the Dnieper line - 21.6.41;
Early graduation according to the Order of the NPO dated May 14 from all schools and the direction of graduates to the western border districts;
NPO Order No. 0367 of 27.12.40 and its repetition on 19.6.41 on the dispersal and camouflage of aircraft, etc.;
Direction People's Commissar of Defense General K.A. Meretskov I.V. Stalin in the ZapOVO and PribOVO to check the combat readiness of the Air Force districts 14.6.41;
The publication of the Directive of the NPO and the Stavka (No. 1) on bringing the troops of the western military districts into combat readiness (signed on 21.6.41 at 22.00, because S.K. Timoshenko and G.K. Zhukov already left Stalin at 22.20, having received his approval of this Directive and sending it with N.F. Vatutin to the communications center of the General Staff).
In total, before the German attack, 225 of the 237 divisions of the Red Army intended for the war against Germany and its allies according to defense plans were thus put on alert.
Only two important measures were not put into practice before the war - general mobilization in the country and the introduction of troops into the foreground of the fortified areas.
The strategic mobilization deployment of the Red Army before the war into the wartime army (5.4 million people), the creation of huge covering armies, the covert mobilization of an additional 793,000 spares, etc., made it possible to carry out practically most measures provided for by general mobilization, which made it unnecessary to carry it out before the war. Already in Peaceful time all 303 divisions planned for the war were formed. All the main things that the country had to and could do to successfully repel the impending aggression were done, if not to touch upon the quality of our troops in comparison with the Nazis. In fact, from March 1941 there was a reciprocal strategic concentration and deployment of the armed forces of Germany for aggression and units of the Red Army - to repel it.
In fact, now a completely different thing is called a miscalculation in the probable timing of the German attack - Stalin's decision, despite the obvious inevitability of Germany's aggression in June 1941, not to announce general mobilization and not to send troops into the fortified areas before the German attack, considering the events carried out in the spring of 1941 completely sufficient, and a covering army of 186 divisions - capable of repelling any surprise attack by Germany and its allies!
This is not a miscalculation in terms, but a conscious decision that takes into account all the pros and cons. At the same time, Stalin made a mistake in one thing - he overestimated the combat capability of our troops, which looked much stronger than the Wehrmacht in terms of the number of divisions and military equipment. This was the main and only miscalculation of Stalin (and NGOs as well).
There was also no miscalculation in anticipating the likely direction of the main attack of the Wehrmacht, but there was a decision by Stalin and the NPO - assuming the possibility of the main attack of the Germans in Belarus, to concentrate our main forces in Ukraine, believing that in Belarus 44 Soviet divisions would be enough for a successful defense against 50 German divisions . And it is more profitable for us to strike back from Ukraine - to Krakow ... Here again, a miscalculation in the combat capability of our troops, and nothing more.
The version about the defeat of our troops on the first day of the war is nothing more than a legend. In fact, only 30 divisions of the first echelon of the covering armies from the Baltic to the Carpathians out of 237 divisions of reserve border districts and the second strategic echelon were subjected to the first blow of the aggressor troops on June 22. The tragedy of the defeat of the main forces of three special military districts (118 divisions) did not occur on June 22, but later, during the oncoming battles on June 24-30, 1941 between the new and old borders.
To prove the superiority of the Wehrmacht in the number of troops and in armament, as the reasons for our failures, for many years the number of Soviet troops, the quantity and quality of their military equipment are underestimated in every way, and, conversely, all this is exaggerated by the Wehrmacht.
So, in fact, Germany put up not 4.6 million people against the USSR, as is commonly believed, but 3.3 million, because. in the air force, air defense and navy, only combat assets, and not personnel, should be taken into account (like ours). In total, the aggressor, therefore, had not 5.5 million people, but 4.2 million against more than 3 million people. in the western border districts and troops of the second strategic echelon.
The ratio in artillery is distorted - we take into account guns and mortars of 76 mm and higher caliber (without anti-tank guns), while the Germans count 14 thousand anti-tank guns (37 and 50 mm) and 5 thousand artillery barrels of 28 OKH reserve divisions. In fact, the troops of the western border districts alone had 37,000 guns and mortars, while the troops of all the aggressors had no more than 31,000 guns.
It is not true that almost all Wehrmacht artillery was motorized. In the states of the German infantry division of the first waves there were 6300 horses, of which almost half were in the artillery regiment. This means that all the artillery of the infantry divisions was horse-drawn. Only the artillery of anti-tank guns, RGK, tank and motorized infantry divisions was motorized.
A total of 3300 tanks and 250 self-propelled guns, and not 4-5 thousand, were thrown by the Wehrmacht against the USSR, of which 1600 were light (T-1, T-2 and T-38) and 1610 medium (T-Z and T-4). This means that against 1610 German medium tanks in the western districts of the USSR there were 160 heavy and medium tanks KB and T-34, which far exceeded the German ones in combat qualities. And against 1600 German light tanks there were about 9 thousand Soviet light tanks, which were in no way inferior to the German ones. The result is an overwhelming superiority over the Wehrmacht in the quantity and quality of tanks. This is without taking into account 2,000 tanks of the mechanized corps of the second strategic echelon.
Against 3046 of all German combat aircraft (1067 fighters, 1417 bombers and 562 reconnaissance aircraft), the air forces of the western districts, fleets and long-range bomber aviation had 9917 combat aircraft, including 7133 in the districts, 1339 in the DBA and 1445 in the fleets.
Aircraft of new types, the Soviet Air Force received from factories not 2739, as they think, but 3719, because. among the new ones, it is necessary to take into account the aircraft of the 1939-40 model. DB-ZF, Ar-2, Su-2, Tu-2, Yak-4, Pe-8, BB-2, of which there were more than a thousand. This means that our Air Force could and should have had not 1540 new types of aircraft against the Germans in June 1941, as they now believe, but more than 3 thousand. Of all 3046 combat aircraft, the Wehrmacht had less than 2 thousand new ones, if we exclude obsolete Yu aircraft -87, Xe-111, Do-217, etc.
Our rifle divisions of the western border districts on 22.6.41 had on average not 8-9 thousand, as long thought, but 12,360 (with a staff of 14,483) - 20 divisions had 14 thousand people each, 70 - 12 thousand each, and 6 - 11 thousand each. The data sometimes given for June 1, 1941 do not take into account the receipt of 500 thousand people from the additional conscription in these divisions in June 1941.
Of those dismissed due to the repressions of 1937-38. 38 thousand commanders and political workers, 12 thousand returned to the army in 1939-40, 9 thousand were dismissed for non-political reasons (natural decline), and about 17 thousand people were expelled from the army for political reasons - unreasonably and illegally. Of these, about 9.5 thousand were arrested.
The opinion that the top commanders who were repressed were the best, and the worst remained in the army, is unproven. The best of the repressed (M.N. Tukhachevsky and others) are often compared in the press with the worst of the rest. The question has not been investigated - what experience of modern warfare (except for the Civil War) could our senior command staff of the 30s (including those who were repressed) have received, serving from the end civil war until 1937, in our small, then backward, territorial-personnel army, in which there were two dozen (26%) personnel divisions in twenty military districts (there were none at all in the internal districts), army departments did not exist from 1920 to 1939 ., major maneuvers began to be carried out only in 1935-37. etc. No wonder 120 of our military leaders went to Germany to study military affairs in the 20-30s.
And the ideas associated with the name of Tukhachevsky were not rejected, as they say, they were not always justifiably introduced into the army before the war, were reflected in the charters. In particular:
The idea of "strike back" became the core of the war plan instead of the more appropriate idea of strategic defense for our army;
Theories of deep combat and operations have obscured for our army the questions of defense, mobile warfare, counter operations, etc.;
The idea of creating cover armies was put into practice on a large scale, which saved us in 1941.
The consequences of the repressions of 1937-1938 against the command staff were partially overcome by the summer of 1941, so they cannot be attributed to the main reasons for the failures of our army at the beginning of the war.
The trouble is that the Red Army did not have time to become personnel either in 1936, or by 1939, or by June 1941. Since 1935, it has developed extensively, increased 5 times - but all to the detriment of quality, especially officer and sergeants.
The Soviet military leadership, preparing for the war with Germany, strenuously sought by 1941 quantitative superiority over the Wehrmacht, especially in tanks and aircraft, but it remained a secret for him that the Red Army lagged behind the German Army many times in the quality of troops, headquarters, command staff of all degrees, especially junior .
The troops were poorly trained in the methods of modern warfare, weakly put together, and not well organized. Radio communications, control, interaction, intelligence, tactics were at a low level ...
The transition of the army to a personnel basis, an increase in its strength by 5 times in 1939 and reorganization in 1940-1941. exacerbated the shortage of command staff and worsened its quality. The real main reason for the defeat of our troops in the summer of 1941 was the unpreparedness of the Red Army to conduct a modern mobile war against an enemy who had the richest experience in it and excellent preparation for just such a fleeting war. Our Armed Forces were not able to realize the huge technical and human potential, which surpassed the potential of the aggressors by the beginning of the war. The reason for this backwardness of our army is the complete failure in 1930-37. advance training of command personnel of the technical level for the multiple increase (deployment) of the Armed Forces before the war. Hasty, emergency measures in 1939-41, and especially in the spring of 1941, could not rectify this situation.
Military Bulletin (APN). 1992. No. 9. S. 3-8.
http://www.hrono.info/statii/filipp_rkka.html
Consider the preparation for war on the part of the USSR. We cannot say that the Red Army was not preparing for war, since the approach of war was felt in the political situation that had developed by the end of the 1930s and its inevitability was determined by the actions of Germany and its allies. Therefore, the USSR was preparing for war, preparing very intensely: a second industrial and economic base was being created at an accelerated pace in the regions of the Volga region, the Urals and Siberia, while special attention was paid to the development of the defense industry: defense spending in the state budget of the USSR for 1941 increased to 43.4 % against 32.6% in 1940. Particular attention was paid to tank building, the aviation industry and the production of ammunition. At the beginning of 1941, Soviet factories produced about two thousand new model fighters (Yak-1, LaGG-3, MiG-3), 458 Pe-2 dive bombers, 249 Il-2 attack aircraft. In 1941, it was possible to increase the production of ammunition by more than 3 times compared to 1940. From January to June 1941, the production of ammunition for the most important types increased by 66%. The production of new types of KV and T-34 tanks proceeded rapidly, so that by June 22, 1941, their number on the western borders reached 1475 pieces (2).
The increase in the mobilization readiness of the Soviet Armed Forces was facilitated by the holding in early June 1941 training camp, according to which 755,000 reservists were called to military units. The deployment of all types and branches of troops continued, their structure improved, new units and formations were created. So, in February - March 1941, the formation of 20 mechanized corps began, and in April - 10 anti-tank artillery brigades of the reserve of the High Command. In addition, it was planned to create 106 air regiments armed with new equipment. In the middle, the number of air regiments increased by more than 80% compared to the beginning of 1939. By the middle of 1941, the total strength of the Red Army had reached more than 5 million people and was 2.8 times greater than in 1939 (2). These facts show that the upcoming war and preparations for it occupied an increasingly significant place in the socio-economic sphere of the country. So the USSR was preparing for war. The question is, what kind of war? In 1941, there were 5 military districts on the territory of the USSR that bordered on foreign states on the European territory of the USSR: the Baltic Special Military District (PribOVO), later transformed into the North-Western Front; Western Special Military District (ZOVO), hereinafter referred to as the Western Front; Kyiv Special Military District (KOVO), hereinafter referred to as the Southwestern Front; Odessa Military District (OdVO), later - the 9th Army; Leningrad Military District (LVO), hereinafter - the Northern Front (3).
By June 1941, the strength of the Soviet Armed Forces was over 5 million people: Ground Forces and Air Defense Forces - over 4.5 million; Air Force - 476 thousand; The Navy - 344 thousand. The army was armed with over 67 thousand guns and mortars, 1860 tanks of new types (1475 on the Western border), while the total number of tanks, taking into account high-speed, multi-tower, floating, etc., was more than 10 thousand units ( of which 8 thousand are on the Western border). Long-range aviation was armed with Il-4 (DB-3F) and Pe-8 aircraft (about 800 aircraft in total). The rest of the aviation was armed with about 10,000 aircraft (of which 2,739 were new types). The Navy was armed with 276 warships of the main types, including 212 submarines (4).
Let us consider the dispersal of these forces among the armies. By the beginning of the war, the Red Army had 28 combined arms armies. Of these, the 1st and 2nd Red Banner armies, as well as the 15th and 16th armies, guarded the Far Eastern borders of the USSR throughout the war, and we will not consider them.
In the Red Army, 2 strategic echelons were formed. Consider the first strategic echelon. On the territory of PribOVO, the 8th, 11th and 27th armies were formed. The 8th Army was created in October 1939 on the basis of the Novgorod Army Operational Group; in August 1940, she was included in PribOVO. By the beginning of the war, the 8th Army included: the 10th and 11th rifle corps (sk), the 12th mechanized corps (mk), the 9th anti-tank brigade; commander - Major General P. P. Sobennikov. The 11th Army was formed in 1939 in the Belarusian Special Military District (later ZOVO), participated in the campaign of Soviet troops in the West. Belarus. in 1940 it was included in the PribOVO; it included: 16th and 29th sk, 3rd MK, 23rd, 126th, 128th rifle divisions (SD), 42nd and 46th fortified areas (UR); commander - Lieutenant General V. I. Morozov. The 27th Army was formed in May 1941 in PribOVO; it consisted of: 22nd and 24th sk, 16th and 29th sd, 3rd rifle brigade (sbr); commander - Major General N. E. Berzarin. The 3rd, 4th, 10th, 13th armies were formed on the territory of the ZOVO. The 3rd Army was created in 1939 in the Belarusian Special Military District on the basis of the Vitebsk Army Group of Forces, in September 1939 it participated in the campaign of the Red Army in the West. Belarus. It consisted of 4 sc, 11 microns, 58 UR; commander - Lieutenant General V. I. Kuznetsov. The 4th Army was formed in August 1939 in the Belarusian Special Military District on the basis of the Bobruisk Army Group, in September 1939 it participated in a campaign in the West. Belarus; it consisted of: 28 sk, 14 microns, 62 UR; commander - Major General A. A. Korobkov. The 10th Army was formed in 1939 in the Belarusian Special Military District, in September 1939 it participated in the campaign of the Red Army in the West. Belarus. It consisted of: 1st and 5th sk, 6th and 13th MK, 6th cavalry corps (kk), 155th sd, 66th UR; commander - Major General K. D. Golubev. The 13th Army was formed in May-June 1941 in the ZOVO, it united formations and units located in the Minsk region. It included: 21st sk, 50th sd, 8th anti-tank defense artillery brigade; commander - Lieutenant General P. M. Filatov. On the territory of the Kyiv OVO, 5, 6, 12 and 26 armies were formed. The 5th Army was created in 1939 in KOVO; it included the 15th and 27th sk, the 9th and 22nd MK, the 2nd and 9th UR; commander - Major General M. I. Potapov. 6th Army - formed in August 1939 in KOVO, in September 1939 participated in the campaign of the Red Army in the West. Ukraine; composition: 6th and 37th sk, 4th and 15th MK, 5th and 6th UR; commander - Lieutenant General N. N. Muzychenko. 12th Army - formed in 1939 in KOVO, in September 1939, participated in the campaign of the Red Army in the West. Ukraine; composition: 13th and 17th sk, 16th MK, 10th, 11th and 12th UR; commander - Major General P. G. Monday. 26th Army - formed in July 1940 in KOVO; composition: 8th sc, 8th MK, 8th UR; commander - Lieutenant General F. Ya. Kostenko.
On the territory of the Odessa Military District, the 9th Army was formed in June 1941. Its composition: 14th, 35th and 48th sc, 2nd kk, 2nd and 8th mk, 80th, 81st, 82nd, 84th and 86th UR ; commander - Colonel General Ya. T. Cherevichenko. On the territory of the Leningrad Military District, 7, 14 and 23 armies were formed. 7th Army - formed in the second half of 1940 in the LVO. Its composition: 54th, 71st, 168th and 237th rifle divisions and 26th SD; Commander - Lieutenant General F. D. Gorelenko. 14th Army - formed in October 1939 in the LVO; composition: 42nd sk, 14th and 52nd sd, 1st tank division, 23rd UR, 1st mixed air division; commander - Lieutenant General F. A. Frolov. 23rd Army - formed in May 1941 in the Leningrad Military District; composition: 19th and 50th sk, 10th MK, 27th and 28th UR; commander - Lieutenant General P. S. Pshennikov (4, 7).
From the above data it can be seen that at the beginning of the war, huge forces were concentrated near the westernmost border of the Soviet Union. At first glance, all Soviet armies look the same, but, considering their qualitative composition, we see serious differences between different armies. For further analysis, we need to go back in time to the Finnish Winter War. A few months before the war, several Soviet armies were deployed: the 14th Army (two rifle divisions), the 9th Army (three rifle divisions), the 8th Army (four rifle divisions) and the 7th Army (10th mechanized corps, three tank brigades, 10th, 19th, 34th and 50th rifle corps, eleven separate artillery regiments, army aviation). Among the armies participating in Finnish war the 7th Army stood out clearly. Knowing that the Soviet Union was preparing an aggressive war against Finland, we can rightfully call the 7th shock army and say that the honor of delivering the main blow will belong to it. This can be confirmed by looking at the commanding staff of this army: the commander is K. A. Meretskov, who commands the LVO, then becomes the chief of the General Staff, and still later receives the title of Marshal of the Soviet Union; the artillery headquarters of the 7th Army is commanded by L. A. Govorov, his name speaks for itself: hardly anyone now does not know the war hero Marshal of the Soviet Union L. A. Govorov.
In this way we can define a shock army. To do this, let's look at the German Wehrmacht. There are clearly expressed mechanisms of aggression in it - tank groups; they are distinguished from ordinary armies by the presence of a large number of tanks. Thus, we see that the main feature by which we can name any Soviet army shock is the presence in it of a mechanized corps (for 1941, this is about 1000 tanks).
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